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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHN QUAS,
:

Case No. 890601-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provides jurisdiction over
"cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the magistrate presiding over successive
preliminary hearings violate the Utah Constitution's guarantee of
due process by basing the reversal of the initial order of
dismissal for insufficient evidence on evidence that was
reasonably available at the first preliminary hearing?
2. Should the district court have exercised its
jurisdiction to quash the improper bindover order?
3. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error under
Utah Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 702, and Appellantfs right
to a jury trial in allowing various expert witnesses to testify
concerning Susan Quas's failure, as explained by the physical
evidence, to comport with norms of committing suicide?
4. Did the district court commit prejudicial error in
1

refusing to suppress Appellant's statements, which were obtained
through violation of Appellant's rights against selfincrimination?
5. Did the district court commit prejudicial error
under Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 802 in admitting the
hearsay statements of Susan Quas?
6. Did the district court violate Appellant's rights to
a fair trial by refusing to present to the jury Appellant's
reasonable doubt and flight instructions?
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of those statutes and constitutional
provisions that do not appear in the body of the brief are
included in Appendix 5.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted by a jury of second degree
homicide and sentenced to serve a term of five years to life at
the Utah State prison, in addition to a one to five year firearm
enhancement term (R. 600-601).
There were two preliminary hearings in this case
because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a bindover order at the first preliminary hearing (R.
12).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and Susan Quas were married in June of 1984,
and moved from Nevada to Utah, hoping to leave their alcoholdominated lifestyle behind them (T. 803). While the Quases were
2
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for spouse abuse (
3

threatening to commit suicide.

(824-827).

Apparently secure

that nothing out of the ordinary would happen, Appellant told
Susan that her ploys wouldn't stop him from leaving, and went
into the shower (826-828).
After the shot fired, Appellant put on a bathrobe,
examined Susan, spent a moment of distress figuring out whom to
call, and finally called for emergency assistance (T. 197-201,
203, 829-831), but it was too late (T. 239-240).

The officers

Susan and John Quas frequently discussed with one
another and others the possibility of divorce (T. 757, 761-763, 7
4

The Quases kept four guns in their house (T. 812-813).
Mark Knudson, who lived with the Quases prior to
Susan's death, saw Susan handling a gun during an argument with
her husband (T. 783-787). Appellant also noted that Susan
frequently handled guns while she was drinking (T. 814-816).
5
Susan had threatened suicide before, and was arrested
once after she refused medical treatment for her wrist, which she
had slit (T. 741)).
6
The evidence was unclear about when the shot fired.
Appellant's call to the emergency service people was logged in at
9:41 p.m. (T. 197-201). The paramedics arrived at the Quas
residence at 9:45 p.m., examined Susan Quas, and determined that
she had been dead between ten and thirty minutes (T. 322-323).
Mr. Wassmer, living near the Quas residence heard no shot during
the twenty minutes prior to the arrival of the emergency service
people (T. 207-211). Ms. Young, living near the Quases,
indicated that she didn't hear any shots during the fifteen or
twenty minutes prior to the arrival of the police, who arrived at
9:15 or 9:20 (T. 221).
A friend of the Quases, Kristine Knudson, who divorced
her husband, Mark Knudson (who was also friends with the Quases),
and moved in with Appellant after Susan Quas died, testified for
the State after she and Appellant parted ways (T. 494-511). Ms.
Knudson testified that Appellant told her different things about
what he did after the shot fired: one time he told her he came
out and put a sheet under her head; another time he told her he
went downstairs and checked the wash prior to calling for
assistance because he knew Susan was already dead (T. 497-500,
504-505).
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7
jfficer Ecwards testified at the first preliminary
hearing that- the State's expert, Scott Pratt, who examined the
gun, indicated that it might not have been wiped (P.H.I 67-68).
But Officer Edwards subsequently indicated twice that the gun had
been wiped
. -:-.2 34; T. 399), , -asmuch as officer Edwards was
the chief investigating officei ..:: the scene, and was a , i ;K jr.
the chain of evidence leading to tht --ii *i\<i of the gun, perhaps
he did have persona] Knowledge that the -u.:. -id be^r. w:p-?d
8
omith *J\ une State Crime Laboratory indicated that
Appellant's gunshot residue test results indicated elements
consistent with, but not unique to, gunshot residue (T. ?4^\.
Appellant was fertilizing the lawn with a liquid
greening agent that day (T. 818-819), and lawn fertilizers
contain elements in common with gunshot residue (T. 617-618).
Mr. Gaskill of the Weber State College laboratory
performed tests excluding lawn fertilisers, \nd f---^^o
n<- ri.nshot
residue
:. ..pro! lar+ ' c -*-.-.c+ '•-, f!E'.
; ie gunshot residue tests were pex tormeo ^n Jus.;; ^ -as
as if she nad shot the gun in the traditional manner, with ner
index finger (T. 656-657). But the evidence indicated that
perhaps she shot the gun with her t-i.im'" whi ] e pointing the ^
5

Officer Edwards found a low velocity spatter of type A
blood on the carpet runner leading to the basement (T. 409). By
stipulation, the State established that Appellant has type B
blood, and that Susan Quas fell within the forty per cent of the
population with type A blood (T. 624-626, 648-649).

Although

numerous other items were tested for blood, this was apparently
the only type A blood found in the Quas home that was away from
Susan's corpse (State's Exhibit 39). Dr. Grey noted at the
autopsy that Susan was suffering from numerous injuries,
including cuts in various stages of healing (T. 666-668).

When

Susan slit her wrist on May 3, 1987, she was dripping blood (T.
738, 789).
Part of the reason that the State's witnesses concluded
that Susan Quas did not shoot herself was the absence of debris
that normally blow back from a target shot at such a close range
onto the gun and trigger hand (T. 406-408, 482, 492, 665-666).
But there was also testimony from the State's experts that the
absence of "blow back" on Susan did not preclude the possibility

herself (T. 680-682, 815). Thus, the gunshot residue test
performed on Susan Quas may have been incomplete (T. 580).
There was testimony that gunshot residue is transitory
(T. 578), and that Susan was covered with a sheet that was moved
(T. 443), and that she was handled by several medical and
investigating people (T. 239-240, 320-323, 416, 650-654) in such
a way that a spatter of blood on her right arm disappeared before
her autopsy when the gunshot residue test was taken (compare
State's Exhibit 43 and Defense Exhibit 2 with State's Exhibits
50-51).
The State's experts indicated that the negative gunshot
residue test did not exclude the possibility that Susan shot
herself (T. 541, 684).
6

10
that she shot herself (T. 613-614, 679).

While the police were

careful to establish that Appellant's hands were dirty (Compare
State's Exhibit 29 with P.H.I 11, 18, 32, 49; P.H.2 20; T. 307,
339, 356, 377), there was no indication that he bore any blood
spatter or other blow back debris.
The State presented testimony from Sherrie Mayer, the
spurned mother of Appellant's daughter, indicating that between
the first and second preliminary hearing, Appellant made several
statements to her, including the statement, "Sherrie, if I can
get away with murder, I can get away with anything."

(T. 512-

521).
Through stipulation, it was established that Shauna
Mayer, Appellant's and Sherrie Mayer's daughter, called Appellant
when he was staying with his parents in Tonopah, Nevada, leaving
11
the following message in August or September of 1988:
My mom wants that $450 you owe her.
That's my school clothes money. And if you
don't pay it, then you're — we are going to
call Detective Edwards. You promised her
you'd pay it John — Johnny little boy.
(T. 802-803).
Inadmissible evidence presented by the State is omitted
from the statement of facts, and discussed infra in points III
10
The large blood spatter on Susan's right arm
disappeared between the photographing and the Quas residence and
the photographing at the autopsy. Perhaps blow back debris
disappeared during the course of the investigation as well.
Compare State Exhibit 43 and Defense Exhibit 2 with State's
Exhibits 50 and 51.
11

The information was refiled in July of 1988 (R. 255-

257).
7

through V of the argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first preliminary hearing in this case ended in an
order of dismissal because the prosecution refused to present
gunshot residue evidence, and thus did not establish probable
cause to bind the case over.

This order of dismissal was

reversed after a second preliminary hearing at which the State
presented the requested gunshot residue evidence, and at which
the State presented additional evidence for the stated purpose of
insuring that the conviction would withstand appellate review.
However, according to the Utah Constitution, any
reversal of the initial order of dismissal should have been
based on evidence that was not reasonably available at the
initial preliminary hearing.

Inasmuch as the gunshot residue

evidence was available at the first preliminary hearing (as was
the majority of the evidence presented by the State at the second
preliminary hearing), and inasmuch as the previously unavailable
evidence presented at the second preliminary hearing was
presented to create the appearance of fairnejss in the appellate
record, the reversal of the dismissal was improper.
The district court, after determining that its case
load was heavier than this Court's, interpreted its jurisdiction
over the improper bindover order as preempted by this Court's
appellate jurisdiction over circuit courts.

The district court

had jurisdiction to quash the defective bindover order, and in
failing to exercise it, expended a great deal of limited judicial
8

resources for naught.
The trial court allowed the presentation of "expert"
testimony that Susan Quas was proven by statistics to be a
homicide victim, because in the experience of the experts, no
other suicide involved a victim holding a gun several inches away
from herself and shooting into the eye.

There was inadequate

foundation for this expert testimony, which was inadmissible
character evidence.

Thus, the admission of this evidence

violated Utah Rules of Evidence 702 and 404.

Because this

evidence distracted the jurors from their duty to focus on the
evidence in this case, its admission violated Utah Rule of
Evidence 403.

In allowing the prosecutor to argue that these

experienced experts had used this extraneous evidence to reach
their professional opinion that Susan Quas was a homicide victim,
and to argue that these experts had already reached a level of
professional certainty meeting or exceeding the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof, the court violated
Appellant's right to a jury trial.
The State presented numerous statements of Appellant
without meeting its burden of demonstrating that Appellant was
informed of his rights and waived those rights in a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary manner prior to speaking with the
police.

Appellant was suspected of homicide and deprived of his

freedom of action from moments after the first police officers
arrived.

Four hours later, Appellant was informed of his rights,

invoked his right to counsel, and was interrogated further.
9

In

these circumstances, under Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, the State had no business presenting Appellant's
statements taken by the police officers.
The State presented statements of Susan Quas predicting
that Appellant would kill her and someday the police would come
and find her dead.

Regardless of the possibility that Susan Quas

committed suicide, these statements, when viewed in context, were
irrelevant.

Particularly because the State had expert testimony

that Susan Quas was not a suicidal person, the admission of these
statements was unnecessary.

Given the strikingly prejudicial

nature of these statements, under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, they
should have been excluded.
The trial court refused to give Appellant's appropriate
instructions on flight and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof.

Particularly because the jurors were instructed

incorrectly concerning the standard of proof to apply, and
because the prosecutor was allowed to tell them that inadmissible
evidence had already demonstrated Appellant"s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the trial court's failure to give Appellant's
instructions violated Appellant's right to a fair trial.
The cumulative prejudice caused by these errors
entitles Appellant to an order of reversal and dismissal.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE MAGISTRATE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS BY BASING A BINDOVER ORDER
AT A SUCCESSIVE PRELIMINARY HEARING
ON EVIDENCE THAT WAS AVAILABLE
AT A PRIOR PRELIMINARY HEARING.
10

A, PERTINENT CASE HISTORY
The first preliminary hearing in this case was held
before Magistrate Eleanor Van Sciver on July 23, July 31, and
August 3 of 1987.

] 2

Over Appellant's objection, in the middle of

the hearing, the magistrate continued the hearing for one week,
in order to facilitate the State's presentation of evidence in
support of probable cause (P.H.I 118-121).

Prior to doing so,

the magistrate indicated the weaknesses in the State's case,
including the absence of the results of the gunshot residue tests
and the foundation for those tests (P.H.I 111-121).
At the continuation of the first preliminary hearing,
Dr. Grey of the Medical Examiner's Office was allowed to testify
that he concluded that Susan Quas was a homicide victim, based in
part on the gunshot residue tests (P.H.I 143-148).

But no

evidence concerning those tests or the test results was presented
by the State at the first preliminary hearing.
After the magistrate again expressed her lack of
satisfaction with the evidence presented by the State, the
prosecutor indicated that the case would stand as presented, and
the magistrate indicated that she would consider over the weekend
Appellant's motion to dismiss the information (P.H.I 167-169).
After considering the matter over the weekend, the magistrate

12
The transcript of the first preliminary hearing will
be referred to as P.H.I. There are two copies of P.H.I in the
appellate record in this case, and one of these copies has been
paginated by the district court. To minimize confusion,
Appellant will refer to the pagination provided by the court
reporter.
11

found insufficient evidence to bind the case over (P.H.I 181182) .
The second preliminary hearing was scheduled to occur
on October 18, 1988, but Appellant did not appear at that
13
hearing, due to car trouble.
In Appellant's absence that day,
the magistrate indicated that the reason she didn't bind the case
over after the first preliminary hearing wcis that the State's
case hinged on the results of the gunshot residue tests (for
example, the Medical Examiner, Dr. Grey's conclusion that Susan
Quas was murdered was based in part on the results of the gunshot
residue tests), which the prosecutor, Mr. McConkie, had told the
14
magistrate not to consider (T.814 2-4).
The magistrate
13
The transcript of that hearing on October 18, 1988,
will be referred to hereinafter as T.814. Pertinent pages of
that transcript are attached in Appendix 1.
14
Mr. McConkie did not explain on the record his
tactical choice not to submit the gunshot residue tests, but
there were weaknesses in that evidence that he may not have
wished to reveal sooner than necessary.
For example, the gunshot residue tests performed in
this case were irrelevant to the unusual shooting of Susan Quas.
The gunshot residue tests done on Susan Quas and those testfiring
the gun were performed in the manner in which all gunshot residue
tests are traditionally performed - as if she pulled the trigger
with her index finger while shooting away from herself (and hence
the gunshot residue tests checked for gunshot residue on the
webbing between the thumb and index finger, and on the back of
the hand)(T. 656-657). Because the evidence indicated that Susan
Quas pulled the trigger with her thumb and while the gun was
pointed toward herself (T. 815, 680-682), the gunshot residue
tests should have been performed in a manner conforming with this
evidence in order to be accurate (T. 580).
For example, the gunshot residue tests performed on
Appellant were inconsistent; one presented at trial found
particles consistent with but not exclusive to gunshot residue,
one presented at trial indicated no gunshot residue (T. 539,
615).
Or perhaps there were ethical reasons why Mr. McConkie
12

indicated that if the State would submit the gunshot residue
tests at the second preliminary hearing, the magistrate would
consider the Medical Examiner's opinion admissible, and bind the
case over (T.814 5 ) .
Mr. Matheson, the prosecutor in the second preliminary
hearing, indicated that the State would be happy to present the
results of the gunshot residue tests, but noted that "to the
extent that this becomes a review issue later on", the State
might need to present some additional evidence (T. 814 6-7).
The magistrate indicated that additional evidence could
be submitted at the second preliminary hearing, but asked Mr.
Matheson if it would be proper to bind the case over at the
successive preliminary hearing as a result of the presentation of
the gunshot residue tests that the State chose not to present at
a prior preliminary hearing (T.814 7 ) . After further argument on
that issue, the magistrate determined that she would rule on the
issue after hearing the evidence (T.814 25-26).
refused to present the gunshot residue tests. There was
testimony that gunshot residue is transitory and can be wiped off
quite easily (T. 578). The photographs of Susan Quas taken at
the Quas residence depict a large blood spatter on her right arm
(State Exhibit 43, Defense Exhibit 2 ) , which spatter somehow
disappeared prior to the autopsy, when the gunshot residue tests
were performed (State's Exhibits 50-51). When presented with a
photograph of the blood spatter taken at the Quas residence, Dr.
Grey indicated that he did see the blood spatter on her right arm
at the autopsy (T. 669), but did not explain what happened to the
spatter prior to the taking of the autopsy photographs. While it
might be inferred that the photographs of Susan's arms, unlike
the photographs of her hands, were taken after Dr. Grey washed
the body, such an assumption conflicts with Dr. Grey's comment
when presenting the photographs of the arms indicating that the
lack of blood on the arms in the photographs supports the theory
that Susan was murdered (T. 665-666).
13

The second preliminary hearing was held on October 21,
1988.

The magistrate apparently adopted the most liberal

approach to refiling of informations - one requiring some
evidence in addition to that presented during the first
preliminary hearing; she found that refiling the information was
proper in this case because the State was cible to accumulate
evidence additional to that presented at the first preliminary
hearing (P.H.2 at 152).
B. UNDER ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, DUE
PROCESS REQUIRES A SHOWING THAT THE EVIDENCE CAUSING A BINDOVER
ORDER AT A SUCCESSIVE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS NOT REASONABLY
AVAILABLE AT A PRIOR PRELIMINARY HEARING.
1. In Utah, Preliminary Hearings are Recognized as Important, and
thus Governed by Strict Procedural Rules.
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court began its special recognition of the
importance of preliminary hearings by extending the right to
confrontation of witnesses to defendants during that critical
stage of the prosecution.

_Id. at 782-786, citing Article I

section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

In doing so, the Court

noted the primary functions of preliminary hearings: relieving
"the accused from the substantial degradation and expense
incident to a modern criminal trial when the charges against him
are unwarranted or the evidence insufficient", and promoting the
defendant's right to a fair trial by providing the defendant with
notice of the charges and discovery of the State's case against
him.

Ld. at 783-784.
15

Appellant will refer to this hearing as P.H.2.
14

While the Anderson prosecution indicated that it would
be inconvenient to present live testimony during the preliminary
hearing, and while the statute governing preliminary hearings
allowed for the presentation of hearsay evidence, the Court found
that allowing the prosecution to base the probable cause showing
on hearsay evidence would defeat the purposes of the preliminary
hearing.

Idl. at 781, 786.

The court explained that if

preliminary hearings are to serve their purposes in "weeding out
improvident prosecutions", in giving the accused a meaningful
opportunity to present an affirmative defense at the preliminary
hearing, and in providing notice and discovery to the accused,
the accused must be able to confront the witnesses against them.
Id. at 786.
2. In State v. Brickey, the Court Again Recognized the Importance
of Procedural Precision in Preliminary Hearings.
Continuing the tradition of special recognition of the
importance of preliminary hearings in Utah, in State v. Brickey,
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the court indicated that refiling an
information after a dismissal based upon an inadequate showing of
probable cause during the initial preliminary hearing was not a
matter left to the discretion of the State.

Ld. at 646-648.

Working under the auspices of Article I section 7 of
the Utah Constitution, the court began its analysis by noting the
importance of preliminary hearings.

The Court cited Anderson,

supra, indicating that preliminary hearings protect the accused
from groundless prosecutions, conserve judicial resources, and
"promote... confidence in the judicial system."
15

_Id. at 646.

The Court explained that unlimited refiling of
informations dismissed for lack of probable cause would not be
tolerated:
For if this were the case, the State could
easily harass defendants by refiling criminal
charges which had previously been dismissed
for insufficient evidence. Considerations of
fundamental fairness preclude vesting the
State with such unbridled discretion. See
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169, 171
(Okla.Crim.App. 1971); Stockwell v. State,
98 Idaho 797, 573 P.2d 116, 138-39 (1977);
People v. Walls, 117 Mich.App. 691, 324
N.W.2d 136, 138 (1982).
Id. at 647.
The court expressly declined the State's invitation to
rely on the good faith of prosecutors in refiling charges.

Id.

at 647.
The problem presented in the facts before the Brickey
court was forum shopping - the prosecutorial practice of refiling
informations in successive courts in search of a favorable
ruling, without the presentation of new or previously
unavailable evidence or other good cause for refiling the
information.

_Id. at 647.

Nonetheless, the standards set forth

in Brickey and in the cases relied on by the Brickey court are
applicable in cases such as the instant one where a successive
preliminary hearing is conducted before the same magistrate:
We find merit in the approach taken by
the Oklahoma courts. In Jones v. State, 481
P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971), the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals held that due
process considerations prohibit a prosecutor
from refiling criminal charges earlier
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless
the prosecutor can show that new or
16

previously unavailable evidence has surfaced
or that other good cause justifies refiling.
481 P.2d at 171.
16
Brickey at 647 (emphasis added).
The language of the Brickey decision, calling for a
showing that "new or previously unavailable evidence has
surfaced" implies that the evidence presented at a successive
preliminary hearing must have been unavailable at the prior
preliminary hearing.

As explained infra, the lesser standard of

"any additional evidence" relied on by the magistrate in this
case would encourage prosecutors to present the bare minimum of
evidence at preliminary hearings, secure in the knowledge that an
"innocent miscalculation" of sufficient evidence could be
remedied by successive preliminary hearings.

Given the interests

at stake in preliminary hearings in Utah (stopping improvident

16
The Court concluded that the prosecutor in Brickey had
failed to present "new or previously unavailable evidence
relating to the issue of consent" during the second preliminary
hearing on the charge of forcible sexual abuse, and reversed the
district court's order refusing to quash the bindover order. Id.
at 647.
At the second preliminary hearing in Brickey, the
prosecutor presented evidence that on the day after the alleged
forcible sexual assault, the appellant had paid the alleged
victim $20 extra for babysitting and asked her out on a date.
The alleged victim's father also testified at the second
preliminary hearing that Appellant had admitted to "'making
advances' toward the victim and touching her genital area and
breasts." JEd. at 645. Although the prosecutor and the
magistrate presiding over the second preliminary hearing both
considered this evidence "new", the Supreme Court found that the
evidence was not "new or previously unavailable". Id_. at 648.
It is unclear whether the Court's basis for such a finding was
that the new evidence presented was irrelevant to the issue of
consent, or whether the new evidence was not previously
unavailable.
17

prosecutions, giving defendants notice and discovery of the
state's case, conserving judicial resources), the higher due
process standard implied in Brickey and explained in the cases
cited in Brickey must govern refiling informations in Utah.
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App. 1971),
the case relied on repeatedly by the Brickey court,

is a case

involving forum shopping and failure to produce new evidence.
Id* at 171.

Key language in that decision should guide this

Court in reversing the magistrate's ruling that successive
preliminary hearings are justified by any kind of additional
evidence.

The court explained:
If the State has sufficient evidence to bring
an accused to trial, it should be prepared to
offer such at one preliminary examination and
not rely on bolstering its case at a
subsequent preliminary examination, if
necessary. It is dilatory to present
evidence on an installment basis at different
preliminaries. Let the State present its
case at the preliminary and be done with it.
If it is insufficient, then the prosecution
is at an end unless new evidence becomes
available or other good cause is shown. Not
only is refiling without cause unnecessarily
burdensome to our overcrowded courts, but it
may constitute harassment of an
accused....Additional or new evidence does
not mean that which was known to the State at
the time of the first preliminary or which
could have been easily acquired.

Id. at 171.
The Jones court concluded that the* evidence presented
at the second preliminary hearing was "substantially the same" as

17 Pages 171 and 172 of the Jones decision are cited at page
647 of the Brickey decision.
18

that presented at the previous hearing, and found no good cause
to depart from the previous dismissal of the charge.

Id_. at 172.

Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Ida. 1977), another
18
case cited repeatedly by the Brickey court,
involved a
magistrate's refusal to allow the State to present additional
evidence after the magistrate indicated the initial showing was
inadequate.

Ici. at 121.

It is interesting to note that the Utah

Supreme Court chose to cite a dissenting opinion in this case,
that of Justice Bistline.

At pages 138-139, Justice Bistline

began by quoting the district judge in the case:
"A person charged with Murder in
the Second Degree is, in the words
of the southern sheriff, 'in a heap
of trouble.' Homicide, in any
form, is very serious business.
This Court, at least, believes a
prosecuting attorney, presenting
evidence at a preliminary hearing
involving homicide in any degree
must go into court with a fully
loaded gun. He is under a duty to
those he represents to present the
best and most persuasive evidence
he has. He may not withhold
evidence in the vain hope the
magistrate may guess or through
Divinity or extra-sensory
perception know what additional
evidence the prosecutor may have
available. In accordance with the
law the magistrate must make his
finding based upon substantial
evidence; not upon speculation or
conjecture."
Justice Bistline continued:
A prosecutor, of course, is not obliged to
18
Pages 138-139 of the Stockwell opinion are cited by
the Brickey court at page 647.
19

show his whole case at the preliminary
hearing. Neither can he be coy and withhold
evidence, in hope of later tactical
advantage, if such evidence is necessary to
convince the magistrate that a suspect should
be bound over on the highest offense charged.
See, Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169
(Okla.Crim.App.1971); Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d
616 (Okla.Crim.App. 197TT~. To allow a
dismissal and refiling every time the
prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of
evidence needed to gain the desired
commitment, ...
"... would not only do violence to
the due process rights of this
Petitioner but would establish a
very dangerous precedent which
could adversely affect numerous
other persons charged with crime.
If the prosecutor could to this
once, why not twice, ten times, or
innumerable times?
Id. at 138-139.
Holmes v. District Court, 668 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983),
involved a prosecutor's decision to file an information directly
with the district court (as allowed by statute) after a county
court had dismissed the charges for lack of probable cause.
19
at 13. At page 15,
the following language appears:

Id.

The affect of allowing a direct filing in a
case where the district attorney states that
he will offer direct rather than hearsay
testimony would constitute approval of an
undesirable practice of presenting as little
evidence as possible at the preliminary
hearing in the county court and then
requesting the district court consent for a
direct filing if no probable cause is found
by the county court. This duplicative
procedure unnecessarily taxes already
strained judicial resources and subjects the
accused to oppression and discrimination.
19
Page 15 of the Holmes decision is cited by the Brickey
court at page 647.
20

If the People may file a direct information
in the district court simply because they
made a tactical error at the preliminary
hearing in the county court, there is little
incentive to comply with the requirements
governing preliminary hearings set forth in
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
interpreted in the case law.
(citations omitted).
Given Utah's unique history of special recognition of
the importance of preliminary hearings, and given the reasoning
and language of the Brickey decision and the precedents cited
therein, this Court should determine that a prosecutor may not
refile an information unless he can justify the reversal of the
initial dismissal order with evidence that was not reasonably
available at the first preliminary hearing, or other good cause
for refiling the information.^
20
It should be noted that this standard will not defeat
the State's interest in prosecuting criminal cases. As the
Brickey court explained in footnote 5,
In Harper v. District Court, Okla., 484
P. 2d 891 (1971), the Oklahoma court clarified
Jones, holding that good cause to continue a
preliminary hearing for further investigation
might exist when a prosecutor innocently
miscalculates the quantum of evidence
required to obtain a bindover and further
investigation clearly would not be dilatory.
484 P.2d at 897. In addition, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has added a new Rule 6 to the
Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals,
permitting the state to appeal from an
adverse ruling at a preliminary hearing. See
State ex rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 498 P.2d
426, 428-29 (Okla.Crim.App.1972).
Brickey at 647-648.
A prosecutor who miscalculates the amount of evidence
required to show probable cause can seek a continuance for
further preparation (as v/as done once in this case, and as might
have been done again after the magistrate indicated the
deficiencies in the State's case, several days prior to the
21

C. THE MAGISTRATE IN THIS CASE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING THE BINDOVER ORDER ON THE BASIS OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE SECOND PRELIMINARY HEARING THAT WAS
READILY AVAILABLE TO THE PROSECUTION AT THE FIRST PRELIMINARY
HEARING.
In the instant case, the magistrate indicated prior to
the second preliminary hearing that she would bind the case over
if Mr. Matheson would present the gunshot residue test foundation
and results that Mr. McConkie had previously refused to present
upon the magistrate's request at the first preliminary hearing
(T.814 2-5, 7 ) . Given this assurance, the State proceeded to
present evidence additional to the pivotal gunshot residue tests
(which were available at the first preliminary hearing), not to
secure a bindover order, but to insure that Appellant's
conviction could withstand appellate review (T.814 6-7).

See

Appendix 1.
It is doubtful that the Brickey court set forth the
Utah due process standard for refiling dismissed cases with an
eye to improving the appearance of appellate records.

Rather, it

seems that the court set forth the standard for refiling cases
to force prosecutors to present their cases forthrightly the
21
first time at preliminary hearing.
dismissal).
In Utah also, a prosecutor faced with an improper
dismissal for lack of probable cause can appeal the ruling. Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(3)(a). See also R. 17, where the
State concedes that extraordinary writs provide the State with
relief from an improper dismissal.
21
See Brickey at 714 P.2d at 647 (indicating that
"fundamental fairness" requires judicial restraint of prosecutors
in this context, because the good faith of prosecutors is "a
22

Given the misapplication of the Brickey standard in
this case, perhaps this Court should refrain from engaging in
Brickey analysis altogether.

Nonetheless, Appellant provides

that analysis infra*
Inasmuch as the magistrate adopted a due process
standard that permitted refiling of the information because the
prosecution presented evidence in addition to that presented at
the first preliminary hearing (P.H.2 152), the magistrate did not
make findings indicating whether the State had presented any
evidence during the second preliminary hearing that was not
22
reasonably available at the first preliminary hearing.
Appellant maintains his position that the only evidence
presented by the State during the second preliminary hearing that
might have met the Brickey due process standard was the testimony
of Kristine Knudson, who testified that after the first
preliminary hearing, Appellant made statements to her concerning
23
the night of Susan's death (P.H.2 73-84).
While the magistrate
fragile protection for the accused.").
22
A summary of the evidence presented at the first and
second preliminary hearings was filed by the prosecution, and can
be found at R. 18-30 and in Appendix 2 to this brief. While the
summary is not completely accurate, it is adequate to give this
Court a purview of the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearings, and to show that, with the exception of the testimony
of Kristine Knudson, all of the evidence presented at the second
hearing was reasonably available at the first hearing.
23
Ms. Knudson indicated, "He said he couldn't tell where
she had gotten shot, and he said that he picked up her head and
that there was blood coming out the back of her head. Then he
said that he put a sheet under her." (P.H.2 75-76). She
indicated that Appellant also told her that when he heard the
shot and left the shower, he could tell Susan was already dead,
23

did indicate that the statements referred to by Ms. Knudson
during the second preliminary hearing were "clearly inconsistent"
with Appellant's statements to the investigating officers (P.H.2
140), the magistrate did not indicate that this previously
unavailable evidence was the reason for the bindover order in the
second case*
Because the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing
indicated her disbelief of Appellant's statements to the
investigating officers (P.H.l 169), it can hardly be assumed that
this previously unavailable evidence from Ms. Knudson resulted in
the bindover order.

Rather, the bindover order was a result of

the presentation of the previously available evidence presented
at the second hearing, the gunshot residue tests.
But as explained by the Brickey court, it was the
State's burden to demonstrate with previously unavailable
24
evidence that the initial dismissal should not stand.
Without meeting the Brickey standard (neither for
purposes of appellate review, nor for purposes of fulfilling the
and went downstairs to check the wash prior to calling for help
(P.H.2 77).
24

The Brickey court explained,
The Jones court further held that when a
charge is refiled, the prosecutor must,
whenever possible, refile the charges before
the same magistrate who does not consider
that matter de novo, but looks at the facts
to determine whether the new evidence or
changed circumstances are sufficient to
require a re-examination and possible
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing
the charges. I<3. at 171-72.
714 P.2d at 647.
24

prosecutors' theoretical duties of following the law and seeing
that justice is done), the State was allowed to refile the
information after taking over one year to get its case
25
together.
Meanwhile, as the transcript of the hearings and
25
Indeed, the prolonged coalescence of the State's case
seems to have had a veritably alchemic effect upon the State's
evidence.
Note how Appellant's gunshot residue test taken on the
night of Susan's death asked for specification of debris on
Appellant's hands, and Officer Edwards wrote "no [sic] clean but
not dirty/fingernails dirty" (State's Exhibit 29). After the
State determined to take issue with Appellant's statement that he
was in the shower when the shot fired, at the first preliminary
hearing, Officer Edwards indicated that Appellant's hands were
dirty (P.H.I 32) that they were sweaty, and that there was grease
on his right hand (P.H.I 49). At the first preliminary hearing,
Appellant's hands were described by Officer Plotnick as dirty
(P.H.I 11) and filmed with dirt as if he had been working in the
yard (P.H.I 18). At the second preliminary hearing, Officer
Spann testified that Appellant's hands were "extremely dirty"
(P.H.2 20). At trial, Officer Plotnick described Appellant's
hands as "soiled...with a film of dirt" (T. 307). At trial,
Officer Spann indicated the hands were "extremely dirty" (T. 339)
and "darkened on the tops and the bottoms" (T. 356). Officer
Edwards indicated at trial that Appellant's hands were dirty (T.
377). One can only wonder if a third preliminary hearing would
have assisted the officers in recalling blood spatters on
Appellant's hands.
Officer Plotnick testified at trial on June 8, 1989
that he recalled that on May 21 of 1987, Susan Quas had told him
that one day he would come to the Quas residence to find that
Appellant had murdered Susan (T. 285-286, 293). This statement
apparently did not merit recording in the police report covering
the incident (T. 296, 315), and apparently was not recalled in
time for the first preliminary hearing, when Officer Plotnick
testified (P.H.I 5-23), or during the second preliminary hearing.
What might be characterized a coincidence in isolation
becomes astounding when repeated. Officer Wright testified at
trial on June 13, of 1989 that on May 16 of 1987 that Susan told
him that Appellant was the guilty one, and that he'd kill Susan
(T. 864). Once again, the statement did not merit recording in
the police report (T. 867).
While Susan Quas had blood spattered on her right arm
when her body was photographed at the Quas residence, that blood
spatter disappeared before the gunshot residue tests were
performed on her (State Exhibit 43, Defense Exhibit 2; State's
Exhibits 50-51). Given the repeated exaltations of police
25

procedures designed to preserve all evidence (e.g. P.H.2 29, T.
322, 416), it is troubling that the blood spatter disappeared.
At the first preliminary hearing, Officer Edwards
indicated that the gun that shot Susan Quas had been analyzed and
the expert checking for fingerprints indicated that it "might not
have been wiped clean" (P.H.I 67-68). At the second preliminary
hearing, Officer Edwards indicated that in his opinion, the gun
had been wiped and there was a piece of red lint caught in
between the barrel and extractor of the gun (P.H.2 34). At
trial, Officer Edwards indicated that the gun had been wiped
clean and was found with a "red piece of cloth" stuck near the
extractor (T. 399). The red piece of lint, or cloth,
unfortunately, was lost prior to analysis or presentation in
evidence (T. 435). Then again, Officer Edwards was the
investigating officer transporting the gun (T. 398-399), and
perhaps he really did have personal knowledge that it had been
wiped.
Prior to trial, the State's evidence conformed to
Officer Edwards1 testimony at the hearing on the motion to
suppress Appellant's statements that until 6:15 a.m. on the
morning following the death of Susan Quas, Appellant was free to
leave police custody (P.H.I 38; M.H. 67-83). Officer Spann's
testimony at trial was the first indication that while waiting at
the Quas residence, Appellant was forced into his kitchen, and
forced to remain and the table, forbidden even to get a drink or
make a phone call (T. 243, 353, 260). Officer Spann prepared a
taped report of the Quas investigation and submitted it to the
department for transcription, but when he contacted Officer
Edwards to get a copy of his report, the report could not be
found (T. 343).
Even in the middle of trial, the State's efforts to
improve the evidence were unceasing. After the exclusionary rule
had been invoked and the witnesses had been instructed to refrain
from talking with one another, Officer Edwards, a witness in this
case, with the acquiescence and in the presence of prosecutors
MacDougall and Matheson, had a little conversation with defense
witness, Mark Knudson, at the county attorney's office on the day
before Mr. Knudson's testimony (T. 876-877). The County
Attorneys and Police Officer Edwards were discussing Mr.
Knudson's prior use of cocaine (T. 879). The court had already
ruled that drug evidence was to be limited in use to
demonstrating Susan Quas's state of mind on a specific occasion
(T. 718), and that evidence had already been presented (T. 731).
It appears that the prosecutors were satisfied with the covert
effect of the little chat on Mr. Knudson's testimony, for they
didn't feel the need during.Mr. Knudson's testimony at trial to
use overtly the evidence concerning his cocaine use. The State's
explanation to the trial court that Officer Edwards was the chief
investigator in the case, and was used throughout the course of
26

trial in this case demonstrate, Appellant's ability to recall the
relevant events deteriorated.
Because the State failed to justify the reversal of the
order of dismissal with previously unavailable evidence, or to
show other good cause for the refiling of the information,
Appellant is entitled to reversal of his conviction, and an order
prohibiting further prosecution of this case unless the State can
satisfy the demands of due process.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
ITS JURISDICTION TO QUASH THE MAGISTRATE'S
DEFECTIVE BINDOVER ORDER.
On November 16, 1988, Appellant submitted a motion in
the district court, seeking quashal of the bindover and dismissal
of the case, based on the prosecution's violation of Appellant's
due process rights in refiling the information without meeting
the Brickey standard (R. 261). After noting that the district
courts obviously have more work to do than this Court, the
district court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the
26b
motion (R. 327; M.H. 13-14).
Appellant petitioned for an
the trial to "help coordinate the witnesses" (T. 881) speaks for
itself.
26a Appellant testified that while he was married to Susan,
he drank to the point of intoxication as often as six days a week
(T. 804-806). Testimony from the State's witnesses confirmed
that Appellant continued to drink during the year plus interim
between the first and second preliminary hearings (T. 507-508,
521).
More than once, the prosecutor acknowledged Appellant's
fogginess and inability to remember the events (M.H. 91, T. 839840) .
26b
The transcript containing all of the hearings on
pretrial motions, stamped 813, will be referred to as M.H.
27

interlocutory appeal of this ruling of the district court, but
27
the Utah Supreme Court denied the petition.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD UNLIMITED ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
The original jurisdiction of the district court is
described in the Utah Constitution in Article VIII section 5,
which reads as follows:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power
to issue all extraordinary writs. The
district court shall have appellate
jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the supreme court, there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
By statute, the district court had plenary original
. ,. . 28
jurisdiction.
27
The petition for interlocutory appeal and the denial
thereof were supplemented to the appellate record and filed with
this Court on March 1, 1990.
28

Utah Code Ann. section 78-3-4 provides:
(1) The district court has original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue
all extraordinary writs and other writs
necessary to carry into effect their orders,
judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the
presiding officer of the Judicial Council,
cases filed in the district court, which are
also within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the circuit court, may be transferred to the
circuit court by the presiding judge of the
district court in multiple judge districts,
or the district court judge in single judge
districts. The transfer of these cases may
be made upon the court's own motion or upon
28

B. ACCORDING TO UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 10 AND 12, THE
DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DISPOSED OF THE MOTION TO QUASH THE
BINDOVER ORDER DURING THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION*
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) indicates
that the insufficiency of evidence to support the bindover order
must be raised in the trial court.

It provides, in part:

The following shall be raised at least five
days prior to trial:
(1) defenses and objections
based on defects in the indictment
or information other than that it
fails to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge an offense,
which objection shall be noticed by
the court at any time during the
proceedingC.]
The fact that this provision encompasses motions to quash
bindovers and dismiss informations based upon inadequate
showings of probable cause is demonstrated by Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7, which indicates that the information is subject to
dismissal by the magistrate if it is not supported by evidence
meeting the probable cause standard.

Cf. e.g. State v. Smith,

the motion of either party for adjudication.
When an order is made transferring a case,
the court shall transmit the pleadings and
papers to the circuit court to which the case
is transferred. The circuit court has the
same jurisdiction as if the case had been
originally commenced in the circuit court and
any appeals from final judgments shall be to
the Court of Appeals.
(4) Appeals from the final orders,
judgments, and decrees of the district court
are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(5) The district court has jurisdiction
to review agency adjudicative proceedings as
set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63, and shall
comply with the requirements of that chapter,
in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
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617 P.2d 232 (Okl.Cr. 1980)(affirming district court's "order
quashing the information" based on insufficient evidence
presented at preliminary hearing).
Even if Rule 12 were not read as granting the district
courts jurisdiction over motions to quash bindovers and dismiss
informations, Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
contemplates that the district court dispose of all objections
relating to the preliminary hearing during the exercise of the
court's original jurisdiction.

That rule states, in part,

(a) Upon the return of an indictment or
upon receipt of the records from the
magistrate following a bindover, the
defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in
the district court. Arraignment shall be
conducted in open court and shall consist of
reading the indictment or information to the
defendant or stating to him the substance of
the charge and calling on him to plead
thereto. He shall be given a copy of the
indictment or information before he is called
upon to plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant
requests additional time in which to plead or
otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be
granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or
want or absence of any proceeding provided
for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignment shall be specifically and
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty
is entered or the same is waived.
Both Rule 10 and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure evidence legislative intent for district court
disposition of objections to inadequate showings of probable
cause at preliminary hearings.
C. WHETHER CHARACTERIZED AS ORIGINAL OR APPELLATE JURISDICTION,
DISTRICT COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO QUASH BINDOVERS AND DISMISS
INFORMATIONS.
While it appears that Rules 10 and 12 contemplate that
30

district courts will dispose of motions to quash bindover orders
and to dismiss informations during the exercise of original
jurisdiction, even if the disposition of such motions were
considered an appellate function, district courts may perform the
function.
The district court in the instant case apparently
viewed the disposition of motions to quash bindovers and dismiss
informations as the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over
circuit courts (M.H. 13-14), which by statute is part of this
29
Court's jurisdiction.
This view was erroneous.
As explained in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1977), when a preliminary hearing is conducted, the presiding
magistrate acts under the unique jurisdiction attaching to the
role of magistrate.

In the Van Dam case, the court was

discussing the impropriety of a city court dismissal of a class A

29

Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(c) reads:
«...

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
....

(d) appeals from the circuit courts,
except those from the small claims department
of a circuit court[.]
Utah Code Ann. section 78-4-11 provides:
Except as otherwise directed by section
78-2-2, appeals from final civil and criminal
judgments of the circuit courts are to the
Court of Appeals. The county attorney shall
represent the interest of the state as
public prosecutor in any criminal appeals
from the circuit court. City attorneys shall
represent the interests of municipalities in
any appeals from circuit courts involving
violations of municipal ordinances.
(emphasis added).
31

Misdemeanor case under the statutory scheme operant at that time.
The court explained,
A preliminary examination does not
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In
such a proceeding, the action is not action
by a judge of any court, but that of a
magistrate, a distinct statutory office.
Justices of the Supreme Court, district
judges, city court judges, and justices of
the peace, when sitting as magistrates having
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law
upon magistrates and not those that pertain
to their respective judicial offices.
Id. at 1327.
Regardless of which judge or justice sits as magistrate
over a preliminary hearing, it appears that the district court is
expected by the legislature to review the conduct and/or findings
of the magistrate when faced with an objection.

If this Court

wishes to characterize this review as "appellate", then Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 and 12 provide the statutory
authorization of district court exercise of this "appellate"
30
jurisdiction.
This Court should inform the district courts that they
have jurisdiction to quash a magistrate's improper bindover
order, and should exercise this jurisdiction in order to prevent
the tremendous waste of judicial resources that occurs when
improper bindover orders are not stricken at the soonest
opportunity.

30
Article VIII section 5 of the Utah Constitution
indicates that the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts
is "as provided by statute".
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, 404, AND 403,
AND APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
BY ADMITTING UNFOUNDED EXPERT TESTIMONY
ON THE FAILURE OF SUSAN QUAS'S BEHAVIOR
TO COMPORT WITH STATISTICAL NORMS OF SUICIDE.
Perhaps the most consistently defended position of the
State's witnesses and prosecutors was that Susan Quas did not
commit suicide because no one commits suicide by holding the gun
3
inches away from themselves and shooting themselves in the eye.
Brent Marchant of the State Medical Examiner's Office
and University of Utah Police Officer, testified that he had
worked at the Medical Examiner's Officer for ten years, and that
he had participated in many of the investigations of the one
hundred and fifty gunshot suicides that occur in Utah each year
(T. 475, 477-478).

He said that in his experience, Susan Quas's

wound was unusual because he'd seen only one case of suicide in
which the victim had shot herself in the eye (T. 480). He
indicated that that shooting involved an elderly blind woman who
had zipped herself inside a sleeping bag, and placed the gun
directly against her eye and shot (T. 480-481).
Dr. Grey, the Assistant Medical Examiner, testified
that he had seen about four hundred and fifty gunshot homicides

31
While Appellant did not object to this evidence at
trial, this Court should evaluate this issue because, as is
demonstrated infra, the trial court in this instance committed
plain error. See State v. Braun, 128 Utah Adv.Rep 45, 47-49
(Utah App. 1990)(this Court has the discretion to address errors
for the first time on appeal when those errors are both plain and
harmful, and will exercise this discretion more liberally to see
that justice is done when more harmful errors occur).
33

and between four hundred and fifty and five hundred gunshot
suicides (T. 652). After explaining that it was possible for
Susan to have shot herself, he indicated
[B]ut it's a very cumbersome and in my
experience completely atypical way for
somebody to commit suicide. When people
shoot themselves, they usually put the gun
where they want the bullet to go and pull the
trigger. I've never seen a clearly proven
suicide where the person has held the gun as
far as away from their body as they possibly
can before shooting.
(T. 683). Dr. Grey explained that he had seen one case of
suicide involving a gunshot wound to the eye - a case of Russian
Roulette (T. 688). He concluded "I have no doubt that somebody
shot Susan." (T. 690).
This evidence was the first the prosecutor chose to
focus on in opening argument (T. 184-185).
As the first "brick" in the prosecution's "wall" of
closing argument, the prosecutor pointed to norms of suicide and
Susan's failure to meet those norms.
For example, you have heard from
witnesses who have examined hundreds of
gunshot suicide wounds, and not one has seen
any self-inflicted wounds like this one. Why
would this woman, even if she were suicidal,
shoot herself in the face, in the eye, from a
distance with outstretched arms? It violates
everything you've been presented with in
terms of human experience and human nature.
In the collective experience of
Detective Edwards, Brent Marchant, and Dr.
Grey and others 3 2 points to homicide on this
score alone.

32
Appellate counsel is unable to find testimony on this
issue from witnesses other than Mr. Marchant and Dr. Grey.
34

(T. 890).

In the middle of his closing argument, the prosecutor

revisited this "brick":
This wasn't a contact wound. It was not
a near contact wound. Indeed, the distance
firing test and Dr. Grey's analysis showed
that the gun was approximately 16 to 18
inches away from Susan Quas' eye when the gun
was fired, give or take two to four inches.
Detective Edwards, Brent Marchant, Dr. Grey
have all witnessed hundreds of suicides by
gunshot wounds, and they told you the gunshot
victims almost never shoot themselves in the
eye. Indeed, the only exception that we've
heard about to prove the rule, one was a
Russian Roulette contact wound recorded by
Dr. Grey, and the other was a blind woman
inside a sleeping bag, contact wound reported
by Brent Marchaiit. Both of these were
contact wounds.33
The collective experience of witnessing
hundreds of gunshot suicides is that never
had any of them seen suicide victims who shot
themselves in the eye from a distance.
(T. 907-908).
As the last drop in the State's "tidal wave" of
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor again emphasized this
evidence:
There was Mr. Gaskill's opinion that it
was highly unlikely that Susan fired the gun,
the opinion of an experienced criminalist;
Dr. Grey's opinion of an experienced
criminalist; Dr. Grey's opinion that the
manner of death was homicide, the opinions of
an experienced pathologist who's examined
hundreds of gunshot suicides and homicides
and whose job it is — this is his job to
determine — the manner of death; an opinion
he holds without a doubt; an opinion he holds
with as much as or more certainty than you
need to have. And a combination of opinions
33
Dr. Grey indicated that the Russian Roulette victim's
wound was a near contact wound, that the gun was right by the eye
(T. 709).
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from a leading criminalist and the State's
Medical Examiner, that Susan Quas didn't fire
the weapon.
(T. 945-946)(emphasis added).
While the State witnesses and prosecutors apparently
were satisfied to rely on this probabilities evidence, and while
the prosecutor represented that this assumption was already
proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see emphasized language
above), the Utah Supreme Court had already decided that such
evidence is not an accurate mode of proof of a person's behavior
when that behavior is at issue in the case.

State v. Rammel, 721

P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986).
In Rammel, a witness named Dyson testified under a
grant of immunity to his and the Appellant's involvement in a
robbery.

_Id. at 499.

When initially confronted about the crime,

Dyson denied any knowledge about or participation in the robbery,
but later confessed.

^Ed. at 499.

The trial court admitted the

testimony of an Officer Welti, which indicated that most people
who eventually confess to the commission of crimes initially lie
to police officers about the crimes.

3x1. at 500.

Apparently,

the prosecution was attempting to show with this evidence that
Dyson's initial denial of involvement of the crime was normal,
and supported the credibility of his later confession.

_Id. at

500.
After discussing the impropriety of admitting this
testimony under evidentiary rules relating to impeachment of
witnesses and foundation for expert testimony, the court
36

explained that the prosecution should not ask jurors to base
their conclusions in a specific case on evidence of probabilities
based on what happened in other cases, but should encourage
jurors to focus on the evidence pertinent to the specific case
before them.

The court stated:

Finally, even if the testimony was
proper impeachment evidence, it should have
been excluded because its potential for
prejudice substantially outweighed its
probative value. In this case, the
prosecution attempted to establish, in
effect, that there was a high statistical
probability that Dyson lied. Even where
statistically valid probability evidence has
been presented - and Welti's testimony hardly
qualifies as such - courts have routinely
excluded it when the evidence invites the
jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific,
numerical conclusion rather than to analyze
the evidence before it and decide where truth
lies. Probabilities cannot conclusively
establish that a single event did or did not
occur and are particularly inappropriate when
used to establish facts "not susceptible to
quantitative analysis," such as whether a
particular individual is telling the truth at
any given time.
Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 allows for expert testimony
34
only when a witness is properly qualified.
Neither Mr.
Marchant nor Dr. Grey was qualified to render an expert opinion

34

The rule provides:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
37

on statistical normal modes of committing suicide because they
were only exposed to those suicide attempts that succeeded.
There is no way to know how many people have held a gun inches
away from themselves and pulled the trigger because of the
inaccuracies inherent in such a mode.

These witnesses were

further removed from qualification to rend€*r statistical analysis
in this case because the variables involved in this case (a blood
alcohol level of .30, a person in the habit of feigning suicide
attempts, a person in the habit of handling guns) most likely
were neither present nor monitored in the other cases.
Even if Dr. Grey and Mr. Marchant were qualified to
render an expert opinion on Susan's conduct based on
probabilities gleaned from statistical analysis of the behavior
of other people, such evidence is inadmissible.

In those limited

circumstances when character evidence is admissible to prove a
person's conduct on a specific occasion, the character evidence
must focus on the person whose conduct is in dispute.

In the

instant case, the prosecution was allowed to inform the jurors
that Susan Quas's conduct on the night of her death could be
deduced from the character, or traditional past conduct, of other
people.

See Utah Rule of Evidence 404.

35
If the trial court had taken the time to exercise its
jurisdiction over the motion to quash the bindover, the court
might have read the magistrate's concerns to this effect (P.H.I
115-116).
36

The rule provides:
Rule 404. Character evidence not
admissible to prove conduct; exceptions?
other crimes.
38

In allowing the jurors to be distracted from their duty
of focusing on the evidence in this case with evidence of other
cases, the court violated Rule of Evidence 403.
supra.

Rammel at 501,

In allowing the prosecutor to go a step further and

assure the jurors that the experts had already reached
professional opinions of Appellant's guilt, which expert opinions
were at least as accurate as the reasonable doubt standard of
proof, the court violated Appellant's right to a jury trial.
Utah Constitution, Article I sections 10 and 12.
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of
his character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same,
or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered
by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.
Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
38

Given the facts that Susan Quas' s behavior v/as
extraordinary when she drank, and that on the night of her death
she had consumed enough alcohol to reach a blood alcohol level of
.30, the possibilities that she might have committed suicide in
an unusual manner or had an accident are troubling, and certainly
could have formed reasonable doubts in the minds of the jurors.
Appellant is therefore entitled to reversal of his conviction.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN ALLOWING INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT
INTO EVIDENCE ABSENT PROPER SHOWINGS BY THE STATE.
A. NUMEROUS STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT WERE ADMITTED THROUGH THE
TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS.
During the State's case in chief, the State presented
numerous statements of Appellant made in his home to several
police officers, and made to Officer Edwards at the West Valley
Police Department.

The statements made at Appellant's home were

to the effect that Appellant said that when the gun went off, he
was in the shower, and were relayed through Officers Cox,
Plotnick, Spann, and Edwards (T. 241; 287-288, 305; 338; 37537
376).
Officers Spann and Edwards also indicated that Appellant
said that the gunshot residue test might not be accurate because

37
The statement was incriminating because the officers
testified that Appellant did not appear to have showered (T. 339340), because the shower was dry (T. 289), and because the water
heater was turned off (T. 383).
State's exhibits 2 and 3, tapes of Appellant's calls to
911 and to the police also contain statements to the effect that
Appellant was in the shower when the shot fired, but the tapes
reflect the emotional distress and confusion that Appellant was
suffering at the time.
39

Appellant had been fertilizing the lawn that day (T. 344; 391% 38
392).
Appellant apparently told Officer Spann that he was
washing some clothes to take on a trip. 39

The statements made to

Officer Edwards at the West Valley Police Department were to the
effect that Appellant said that he had been in the shower for
four or five minutes, was half shaved, and had washed his hair
when the gun went off, and that prior to the shooting, he had put
the pants and some shirts to his suit into the washer (T. 37540
378; 453-460, 474).
Officer Edwards was also allowed to
testify that when he asked Appellant how the sheets came to be
41
underneath Mrs. Quas, Appellant refused to answer (T. 411).
B. PRIOR TO ADMITTING THE STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT, IT WAS THE
STATE'S DUTY TO ESTABLISH APPELLANT'S KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
WAIVER OF HIS RIGHTS PRIOR TO MAKING THE STATEMENTS.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court
established that prior to submitting exculpatory or inculpatory
statements of the accused which stem from custodial
38
The statement was incriminating because the pellet
fertilizer and fertilizer spreader at the Quas home did not
appear to have been used (T. 344), and because the lawn at the
Quas residence did not appear to have been fertilized with
pellets (T. 618-619).
39
The statement was incriminating because the washer
contained mostly towels (T. 386).
40
Defense Exhibit 1 is apparently the transcript of the
taped interview with Officer Edwards, pertinent pages of which
are included in Appendix 3.
These statements were incriminating because Appellant's
appearance did not match the described activities, and because
the washer contained primarily towels and leisure wear (T. 386).
41
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)(use of postarrest silence is a violation of rights against selfincrimination) .
40

interrogation or interrogation occurring when the accused is
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the State bears
the burden of proving that prior to making the statements, the
accused was given his "Miranda" warnings,

and made a voluntary,

knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.
445.

384 U.S. 436, 444-

The Court explained the difficult burden the state bears in

asserting waiver of rights, and why the burden for admissibility
is on the state:
If the interrogation continues without
the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel. This
Court has always set high standards of proof
for the waiver of constitutional rights, and
we re-assert these standards as applied to
in-custody interrogation. Since the State is
responsible for establishing the isolated
circumstances under which the interrogation
takes place and has the only means of making
available corroborated evidence of warnings
given during incommunicado interrogation, the
burden is rightly on its shoulders.
43
Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
42
"Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."
384 U.S. 436, 444.
43
See also 384 U.S. 436 at 479, "But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him."; State v. Shuman, 639 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah
1981)("Under Miranda, a person in custody must be informed of his
right to remain silent prior to interrogation. That warning is a
prerequisite to the admissibility of any statement made by a
defendant during custodial interrogation."); State v. Lopez, 451
P.2d 772, 775 (Utah 1969)("[W]here there is in-custody
41

In State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed in dicta the order of proof involved in
the presentation of custodial statements under Article I section
12 of the Utah Constitution:
When the state seeks to put the confession
before the jury it must establish its
competency to the court. To do this it must
show that the confession was given by the
accused as his voluntary act; as an
expression of his independent and free will,
uninfluenced by fear of punishment or by hope
of reward; that it was not induced or
influence...In laying a foundation for
offering the writing, if a written
confession, or the conversation, if an oral
confession, the state will of course be
required to show the time and place of the
conversation, or the writing and signing of
the instrument and also what is generally
called a prima facie showing that it was the
free and voluntary act of the accused. Then
when the conversation or writing is offered,
is the time for the accused to make objection
to its competency. When such objection is
made, the court will hear all the evidence
pertaining to that question and itself
determine its voluntariness as a matter of
law - that is, the competency of the offered
evidence.
Lead opinion of Justice Larson, joined by Justice Moffat at 185.
Justices Wade, McDonnough, and Wolfe, again in dicta,
preferred the following rule:
(5) A modern English ruling takes a middle
path, and seems to receive the confession
unless attacked by evidence of an improper
inducement and then in case of doubt leaves
upon the prosecution the burden of convincing
the court of the admissibility.

questioning by police officers, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege in that regard.").
42

Id. at 196.
As this case so amply demonstrates, it is the State who
is in the best position to know the facts surrounding custodial
44
statements,
and under Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, the rule and reasoning of Justices Larson and
Moffat should be formally adopted by this Court.

Prior to

presenting custodial statements of defendants to jurors, the
State must present them to the court, along with a prima facia
showing of voluntariness.
Even if this Court were to adopt the more liberal
procedure of Justices Wolfe, McDonnough, and Wade, all
44
Appellant was under emotional distress and had been
drinking on the night of his wife's death (T. 251-252, 377). His
testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress his statements
concerning that night was understandably vague and incomplete
(M.H. 48-66).
At the first preliminary hearing, the State provided
the testimony of Officer Edwards concerning the nature of
Appellant's custody. When asked, "[H]ad Mr. Quas been placed
under arrest any time prior to [being taken to the police
department]?", Officer Edwards forthrightly explained,
At that time, I asked Mr. Quas who he wanted
to call. He said, call Russell Wagner, W-ag-n-e-r. I asked him how he spelled the
name. After he spelled it, I looked in the
phone book on my desk. I pulled it out. On
a yellow piece of paper I wrote the name, the
address, and the phone number.
(P.H.I 38).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer
Edwards maintained his position that Appellant was free to do as
he pleased and was not in custody until 6:15 the morning after
Susan's death, when he was arrested (M.H. 67-83).
It was not until trial that the State revealed that on
the night of Susan's death, Appellant was forced into the kitchen
by two officers, forced to remain seated there, and not allowed
even to get a drink or make a phone call during the two hours
prior to his transport to the police department (T. 243, 353,
360). The police report written by the officer making these
admissions at trial, according to Officer Edwards, was lost (T. 343).
43

statements taken from Appellant were challenged by Appellant's
45
motion in limine,
and it was the State's burden to demonstrate
the admissibility of the statements.
C. APPELLANT WAS A HOMICIDE SUSPECT AND SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION AT HIS HOME AND AT THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.
In Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983),
the court explained that during investigation, a police officer
is not obligated to give Miranda warnings to everyone
questioned; rather, it is when the investigation becomes
custodial or accusatory that the Miranda warnings must be given.
Id. at 1170.

The Court listed four factors to be considered in

determining whether the interrogation is investigatory or
accusatory:
(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether
the investigation focused on the accused; (3)
whether the objective indicia of arrest were
present; and (4) the length and form of
interrogation.
Id. at 1171, quoting State v. Riffle, 638 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1981).
Although Carner discussed various federal precedents, the
opinion is based on Article I section 12 of the Utah

45
On May 15, 1989, Appellant submitted a motion to
suppress "any and all statements by the defendant, and fruits of
any such statements, made in violation of the defendant's rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)."
(R. 412).
The court denied the motion on May 24, 1989, finding
that Appellant was not in custody when the statements were taken
(R. 446-447). A copy of the court's findings is attached as
Appendix 4.
44

Constitution.

Id. at 1272.

The court explained that an investigating officer must
determine if a crime occurred and who committed it# and found
that the interrogation present in the earner case occurred prior
to the officer's ascertainment that a crime had been committed,
and was therefore investigatory, rather than accusatory.

icU at

1172.
Review of the facts finally presented at trial
demonstrates that Appellant was both suspected of homicide and
deprived of his freedom of action at his home and at the police
station.

There was no question in the minds of the police

officers that a crime had been committed, and no question in
their minds that Appellant had committed it.
1. Appellant was suspected of homicide and subjected to custodial
interrogation at the Quas residence.
On their way into the Quas residence, the police
officers noticed a purse, a mug, and a cigarette lighter on the
front porch (T. 237, 286-287, 348-349).

This made the officers

46
At trial, the prosecutor indicated that Appellant's
reliance on Carner was misplaced because earner was supposedly
superseded by federal case law focusing on custody and abandoning
the inquiry concerning whether the person subject to
interrogation is a suspect (R. 439-445; M.H. 88). The trial
court apparently followed the prosecutor, basing its denial of
the motion to suppress solely on the absence of custodial
interrogation. See Appendix 4.
This reasoning flies in the face of perhaps one of the
most basic concepts of federalism - federal court interpretations
of the federal constitution may be persuasive authority, but do
not govern or supersede state court interpretations of state
constitutions. E.g. Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 141-144
(Utah 1987)(concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Durham
and Zimmerman).
45

suspicious/ and was apparently the basis of Officer Spann's
directive to treat the case as a homicide (T. 348-349).

At the

first preliminary hearing, Officer Plotnick indicated that the
absence of blood spatter and appropriate powder burns on the body
of Mrs. Quas led him and Officer Spann to believe the case was a
homicide (P.H.I 15). Officer Edwards also testified that his
examination of Mrs. Quas led him to the conclusion that Mrs. Quas
had been killed (P.H.I 41; T. 404-412).

All of the investigating

officers viewed the body of Mrs. Quas prior to speaking with
Appellant (T. 238-239; 299-301; 337; 374).
On the night of Susan Quas's death, Officer Cox was the
first officer to arrive at 9:43 p.m., and Officer Plotnick
arrived two minutes later (T. 235-237, 240). According to
Officer Cox, it was a couple of minutes after Officer Cox arrived
that Appellant told him that he was in the shower when the shot
fired (T. 241). Officer Plotnick indicated that it was a couple
of minutes after he arrived when the statement concerning the
shower was made to Officer Cox (T. 305).

At the time the

statement was made, Appellant was standing near Susan's corpse,

47
None of the statements were placed in context to
determine whether the statements were spontaneous or in response
to questions (T. 287). Officer Edwards was unable to separate
which statements were made to him at the Quas residence, which
statements were made at the police station prior to the
activation of the tape recorder, and which statements were made
at the police station on tape (T. 454-461, 471-472).
This might be explained by the two year passage of time
between Susan's death and Appellant's trial.
As noted supra, the vagueness of the record is the
State's responsibility; it was the State's burden to prove the
statements admissible.
46

and between Officers Cox and Plotnick (P.H.I 20-21).
Officer Spann arrived at the Quas residence at 9:48 (T.
333-335).

When he arrived, he looked at Mrs. Quas and discussed

the suspicious nature of the scene first with Officer Plotnick
and then with Officer Cox, and they determined to treat the case
as a homicide and to consult with homicide detective Edwards (T.
348, 349).
Officer Spann met Appellant at 9:51 or 9:53 (T. 337).
Ke indicated that it was at that time that Appellant made the
statements concerning the shower (T. 338). Officer Spann and
Officer Cox moved Appellant into the kitchen (T. 350). This was
not easy because he was emotionally distraught; it took them tv/o
or three minutes (T. 353). Officer Cox stayed with Appellant at
the kitchen table (T. 353).
Appellant was at the kitchen table and interviewed
while there were at least four officers present in the Quas
residence (T. 241, 305, 338, 375). When asked if Appellant was
cooperative, Officer Spann noted that Appellant was so obdurate
as to try several times to get up from the kitchen table to make
a phone call and to get a drink (T. 360). He was forced to stay
at the kitchen table with Officer Cox for about an hour and a
half to two hours (T. 243).
Homicide detective Edwards was called to the Quas
residence to investigate a homicide at 9:50 or 9:55, and he
arrived at about 10:15 p.m. (T. 365-366; 442). After he was
informed by Officer Spann and Plotnick of the suspicious
47

circumstances, and after he examined the body of Mrs. Quas, he
went into the kitchen and interviewed Appellant and administered
a gunshot residue test on Appellant (T. 372-374, 387). He then
had Appellant sign a form consenting to the search of the Quas
residence (P.H.I 63-64).
Officer Edwards indicated that before he even walked in
the Quas residence, he suspected Appellant of homicide (T. 443).
When asked if Appellant was under arrest at the Quas
home, Officer Edwards indicated he was not, and indicated that if
Appellant had wanted to leave, Officer Edwards "imagined" the
officers would have let him go (M.H. 68).
The police had seized Appellant's car keys and placed
them into evidence (M.H. 80).
2. Appellant was suspected of homicide and subjected to
custodial interrogation at the police station.
Officer Edwards indicated that two hours after the
police arrived at the Quas residence, Officer Cox came to Officer
Edwards at the Quas residence, relaying Appellant's request for
permission to leave (M.H. 68). Officer Edwards suggested that
Officer Cox ask Appellant "if he wants to go down to the P.D. or
somewhere."

(M.H. 68).

Appellant v/as driven in a patrol car to the police
department around 11:00 p.m., about two hours after Susan's death
(M.H. 75, 80). Appellant was left in a line-up room with

48
Indeed, the keys were presented in evidence at trial
(R. 560), although their relevance and probative value are
abstruse at best.
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Officer Cox (M.H. 69, 70; T. 244). Officer Edwards interviewed
Appellant at about 1:10 a.m. (M.H. 75). Officer Edwards
indicated that when he arrived at the police department, prior to
questioning Appellant, he offered to let Appellant call a friend
to come and pick him up (M.H. 70).

Officer Edwards indicated

that prior# to the taped interview, Officer Edwards read
Appellant his Miranda rights, and told him he was not under
arrest, but was free to leave (M.H. 71). Officer Edwards
maintained that Appellant remained at the police department, in
the line-up room with Officer Cox, "free to leave", until 6:15
a.m., when he was placed under arrest (M.H. 73, 81).
Because Appellant was suspected of homicide, and
because his freedom of action was curtailed by the police from
moments after they arrived until Appellant was formally arrested,
Appellant should have been informed of his rights and those
rights should have been honored.
D. THE STATE FAILED TO INFORM APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHTS IN A TIMELY
MANNER, AND VIOLATED THOSE RIGHTS ONCE APPELLANT INVOKED THEM.
While the transcripts indicate that minutes after the
investigating officers arrived, they suspected that Appellant
had killed his wife, and while the trial transcript indicates
that minutes after the investigating officers arrived, they began
depriving Appellant of his freedom of action, the trial
transcript does not demonstrate that Appellant was informed of
his Miranda rights during the two hours that the officers
50
But see Appendix 3, where it appears that Appellant's
friend was not mentioned until well into the taped interview.
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examined Appellant at his home.

The admission of his statements

made at his residence therefore violated Appellant's rights
against self-incrimination under Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the federal
constitution.
4.
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While Officer Edwards finally gave Appellant a Miranda
warning when he interrogated him at the police department,
immediately after the warning, Officer Edwards violated
Appellant's federal right against self-incrimination when
Appellant requested counsel and Officer Edwards neither clarified
the request nor ceased the interrogation.

See Appendix 3.; State

v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988)("[W]hen an accused
makes an arguably equivocal request for counsel during custodial
interrogation, further questioning must be limited to clarifying
the request.

If the request is clarified as a present desire for

assistance of counsel, all questioning must cease as if an
initial unambiguous request had been made.").
E. THE ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENTS WAS PREJUDICIAL.
In opening argument, the prosecutor emphasized the
importance of Appellant's statements, characterizing them as one
of the two critical areas of evidence the jurors would focus on,
and asked the jurors "most importantly" to "focus on what he
said." (T. 183, 188).
In closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated the

51 a

Salt Lake City v. Carner, Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
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statements (894-902), characterizing the statements as
"incredible and wildly inconsistent stories", and as "an outright
lie." (T. 902).
As demonstrated by the statement of facts and previous
argument, without the statements, the State would have had to
rely on inconclusive ballistics evidence.

In these

circumstances, it cannot be said that the admission of the
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Appellant
is entitled to reversal of his conviction.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 402, 403, AND 802
IN ADMITTING THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF SUSAN QUAS.
On the morning of June 8, 1989, defense counsel moved
the court for an order excluding statements made by Susan Quas to
the police about month before her death that one day the
officers would come to the Quas residence and find Mrs. Quas
dead, to find that Mr. Quas had killed her (T. 271). The
prosecutor argued that the statements were admissible because the
defense had opened the door to the evidence by presenting in
opening argument the theory that Susan Quas committed suicide (T.
275).

He also argued that the statements were relevant to the

identity of the perpetrator (T. 278).

The court denied the

51b As the prosecutor later argued (T. 889), there was no
question of identity in this case.
As is explained infra, this latter argument of the
prosecutor demonstrates that even the prosecutor did with this
evidence what the jurors were instructed not to do. He thought
the statements could be used as proof of the truth of the matter
asserted, that John Quas killed his wife. While such reasoning
is difficult to banish from the finest minds, it is improper•
52

motion to exclude the statements, but agreed to instruct the
jurors about the limited use of the evidence after the testimony
of the witness quoting the statements (T. 280-281).
Officer Brooke Plotnick testified that on May 21st of
1987, he responded to a family fight at the Quas residence, at
which time Susan Quas, who was very intoxicated, told him that
John Quas would kill her and the officers would find her dead one
52
day (T. 285-286, 293).
The statements were made the same night
and an hour and a half before Susan Quas rode on the hood of the
Quas automobile to a nearby gas station, where she was arrested
for public intoxication and spouse abuse.

See T. 744-754; 293-

295 (testimony of Officer Plotnick and two neighbors witnessing
the incident).
Officer John Wright was also allowed to testify that on
May 16, 1987, he had responded to a family fight at the Quas
residence, at which time Susan Quas, who was very intoxicated,
told him that she was not the guilty one, and that one day
53
Appellant would kill her (T. 864).
The statements were made
52
It should be noted that these statements apparently
were not recorded in the police report covering the incident, but
after Officer Plotnick learned that Susan Quas was dead, he
remembered the statements because, as he explained to the jurors,
"Not too many people tell you that someone is going to kill
them." (T. 296, 315).
However, for some reason, he did not present the
statements at the first preliminary hearing when he testified
(P.H.I 5-23), or at the second preliminary hearing.
53
It should be noted that yet again, the officer failed
to note these statements in his initial police report covering
the incident; but that Officer Wright rewrote his report to
reflect the statement after Susan Quas died (T. 867).
Officer Wright did not present these statements at the
53

the same night and apparently at that time that Susan was
arrested for intoxication and spouse abuse after inflicting big
bleeding scratches on Appellant's face.

See T. 866-867; 791-793

(testimony of arresting officer and Mark Knudson, who were
present).
A. THE STATEMENTS OF SUSAN QUAS, TAKEN IN CONTEXT, WERE
IRRELEVANT.
The only circumstance in which Susan Quas's statements
might have been relevant would have been if her statements
rebutted Appellant's defense that Susan Quas committed suicide.
While in some cases, a hearsay statement that the declarant would
be killed by someone might be interpreted as demonstrating a
fearful state of mind implying a love for life on the part of the
declarant, in the unique facts of this case, such an inference is
unreasonable.
If Susan Quas valued her life and were afraid that her
husband would kill her, why, on the night of making those
statements, did she jump on the roof of Appellant's car, and
remain on the hood of the car, trying to break the windshield
while he drove three blocks? (T. 744-746, 752, 754). If Susan
Quas were afraid that her husband would kill her, why, once the
car stopped moving at the gas station did she attack him, vowing
to kill him, hitting him, choking him, and pulling his hair? (T.
747, 752). And why on May 16th, did Susan physically attack
Appellant when others were present if she feared for her life?

first or second preliminary hearings.
54

(T. 8 6 6 - 8 6 7 ; ' * I - L' : .
* • • -l( '

1J !

'"

- '

reflective of

fear of death, wiy >*ii: ti.e p u u c c vx.
statements =' r *-"' <- * i *. r leave t Me ^uas reticieiu ^ witi.o^t
J

protecting
report concerning

rhe i n c i d e n t ;

lu-(i:;„. trse statements
a;. :

^n "iit- .I.L.',

/a.. *
"""s *

o f f i c e r s interpc eted what the>

ci

* ~ears :: \; e pel -t-

ivn, ... . :

v *^< .

statements

-

(they indicated

^

,

: ecord t:^ stateru-^ io
: *c

..u -:b* t

-*
n

* •. i

~;66-3f:: ' ^ as

anutner i.iui.M'P hravv

::

* •••

^re - n d e

those statements .ii5 pre ui oi J^bu.
r-1

great

;

^.-

'."^ Ai^'A L; ^ .v.:t
and then characterize

-

that she w a s i n t u x . c a t e ; *c the ;<oi: t

.i.Lj-xerence \

yust another aspersion cast

'cs' ' i < e ] \ ,

w

^.ui's

\ m i r a ^ :on ^.nd * ] eap of faitl

i ^.n • . ^ ...:. : ;.

_

•"

••estimenv -:. i ,iven the danger that * he -uio..^ JI

too
1 -*

-•!..-» coS<

were

let. alone implement, ;l.e concept c; ; a n c e d
jse of the e v i d e n c e .
Because the states of mind reflected

in the statements

^;.;.oxica:_. and anger at John Quas) v*ere irrelevant

tc the

-nile Officer Plotnick indicated that the oth-i
arresting officer w r o t e the report concerning that incident, no
e v i d e n c e wa s p r e sen t e d t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s recorded + "•<* t- h -H a *• .
The court gave repeated instructions on the theory
limited use of evidence. E.g. T 290-291, 864-865 R 585,

of

issue of whether Susan Quas could have committed suicide about a
month after she made the statements, the statements violated Utah
Rules of Evidence 402 and 802.5
B. THE ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENTS VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE
403 AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
Even if the states of mind reflected in Susan Quas's
statements were relevant and thus admissible under the state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule,
56

because of their lack of

Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute,
or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 provides:
Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by law or by these rules.

Utah Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as follows:
....

(b) "Hearsay" is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
57

Utah Rule of Evidence 803 provides:
The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
....

(3) A statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates
56
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* or example, there was no evidence presented that
Appellant had ever acted in a violent way toward anyone prior to
Mrs. Quas's statements• Six days after these statements were
made to Officer Wright and two days after these statements were
made to Officer Plotnick, Mrs. Quas told a fellow employee that
her husband would never hurt her (T. 7 5 7 ) . There was testimony
that Mrs. Quas had a habit of drinking to excess (T. 245, 254,
293, 510, 742, V79-78C) and was tired of being arrested (T. 770).
Perhaps her statements to the officers were an effort to defl ect

blame from,, h p r ^ i K

-i ri ^ o n t o

Annellant.

when the officers quoted them to the jurors.
Inasmuch as the State presented expert witness
testimony from the emergency room physician who treated Susan
after her suicide attempt on May 3, 1987, (and hearsay testimony
of the social worker who assessed Susan that day) to the effect
that Susan was not a suicidal person (T. 721-735), there was no
need to present Susan's statements to Officer Plotnick in an
effort to rebut Appellant's theory that Susan Quas was a suicidal
59
person.
2. Prejudicial Effect
In both State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977),
and State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
Court emphasized the careful analytical approach that a trial
court must take in evaluating the admissibility of the pre-death
hearsay statements of a victim in a homicide case.

The court
60
repeatedly urged first a scrupulous relevance inquiry,
to be

followed by a meaningful consideration of the inevitable
61
prejudice attendant to such statements.
The court noted twice
that curative instructions to jurors are unlikely to be

59
See State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988)(part
of probative value inquiry involves seeking alternate modes of
proof of the assertion proved by the hearsay statements).
60

See Wauneka, 560 P.2d at 1379-1381; Auble, 754 P.2d at

61

See Wauneka, 560 P.2d at 1379-1381; Auble, 754 P.2d at
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VI.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL IN FAILING TO GIVE
THE JURORS APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTIONS
CONCERNING REASONABLE DOUBT AND
APPELLANT'S ABSTINENCE FROM FI ,IGHT,
x,. xiUAL COURTS ARE DUTY BUUNL
---

-- " -
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S

in the context of specific intent instructions, general intent
instructions, and the absence of the defendant's requested
voluntary intoxication instructions.

The court set forth the

most elementary principles of law governing instruction of
juries:
The trial court has a duty to instruct the
jury on the lav/ applicable to the facts of
the case. Encompassed in this duty is the
right of the defendant to have his theory of
the case presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable way.
Id. at 78.
The court noted that trial courts should not phrase
instructions in vague legal abstractions, but should tailor the
instructions to the facts in the case.

Id_. at 79 and n. 3.

The court concluded by explaining why the trial court's
performance required reversal in that case:
We believe a substantial likelihood exists
that the instructions given in the present
case, when considered together, confused and
misled the jury in its deliberation on the
principal issues of the case to the detriment
of the defendant. The instructions failed to
present to the jury in a clear and
understandable manner the substance of the
defense advocated by the defendant. The
instructions thus constitute error which was
prejudicial to the defendant and deprived him
of a fair trial.
Id. at 80.
As is discussed infra, the trial court in the instant
case refused Appellant's proposed jury instructions concerning
the meaning of reasonable doubt and inferences to be drawn
between lack of flight and lack of consciousness of guilt.
60

In so

doing, the court violated Appellant, 's ricrht tc have the jury
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follows:
The flight or attempted flight of a
person immediately after the commission of a
crime or after he is accused of a crime that
has been commited [sic], is not sufficient in
itself to establish his gui It; but such
flight, if proved, may be considered by you
in light of all other proven facts in the
case in determining guilt or i nnocense [sic].
On the other hand, the fact that a., person did
not flee after the occurrence of an incident,
if proved, may also be considered by you in
light of all other proven facts in the case
*•• determining guilt or innocense.
Consciousness of guilt may be inferred
from flight, however, it does not necessarily
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged,
and there may be reasons for flight fully
consistent with innocense. On the other
hand, lack of consciousness of guilt may be
inferred from the fact that a person did not
flee; however, it does not necessari ly
reflect actual innocense of the crime
charged, and there may be reasons for lack of
flight fully consistent with guilt.
Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight
or lack of flight shows a consciousness of
guilt or lack of consciousness of guilt and
the significance, if any, to be attached to
any such evidence are matters exclusively
within the province of the ;ury.

. ..-apparently

:

.• :

••

•

•

.j'.'tion was

written on the- instruction iy tne court.
Requested by Defendant, but nwt_ given by

the Court. Court concluded that if this
instruction was given it in effect would be
commenting on non-evidence, and clearly
should be left to argument.
(R. 595).
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the law of Utah
does not forbid flight instructions as "comments on the
evidence", but permits the use of flight instructions when the
facts of the case warrant them.

State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579

(Utah App. 1988); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574-575 (Utah
1983); State v. Gonzales, 517 P.2d 547 (Utah 1973); State v.
Robison, 498 P.2d 658 (Utah 1972).
The trial court's ruling might be read as a conclusion
that it is improper to draw an inference from failure to act,
where the opposite inference would legitimately follow from the
action.

However, in this jurisdiction, inferences may be drawn

from failure to act.

See e.g. State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052,

1058 (Utah 1985)(trial court's duty to instruct includes
instructions regarding inferences that might be drawn from
failure to act (failure to call a witness supports a negative
inference).
C. THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANT'S PROPOSED REASONABLE
DOUBT INSTRUCTION.
During the voir dire of the prospective jurors in this
case, the trial court instructed them as follows:
The standard of proof in a criminal case
is that the State has the burden of proving
each and every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and
62

convinces tl le understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it,
A reasonable doubt is not one that is
merely possible, fanciful or imaginary #
because most everything relating to human
affairs is open to some possible doubt. But
a reasonable doubt is one which is real and
substantial. It is a doubt based upon
reason, and one which reasonable men and
women would have upon a consideration of al 1
the evidence. It must arise from the
evidence or the lack of evidence in the case*
If after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all of the evidence you can
honestly say that you are not satisfied of
the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable
doubt. But if after such impartial
consideration and comparison of all the
evidence you can truthfully say that you have
an abiding conviction of the Defendant's
guilt such as you'd be willing to act upon in
the more weighty and important matters
relating to your own affairs, you have no
reasonable doubt.
(_

_ 0 -1 7)(emphasis a d d e d ) .
The prosecutor in opening argument. i nstructed 11 Ie

You'ii be instructed by the Court on what
reasonable Joubt means. It doesn't mean
imagination or speculation or remote
possibility. It means a reasonable doubt; a
doubt based on reason. Reason is what the
State asks you to apply to the facts and the
evidence cf this case.

''* *V. .-< c o jnsel
moved to strike Lhe panel because the court's reasonable doubt
instruction inciuc-"

T ^rnuage that the rtah Supreme Court hod

held improper in U a -.. - • . i e mil.

*:

^- . ate v . Johnson (
"
'
!
"
. ' '?).

After argument, r.he v.nr' denied "ne motion to strike the panel
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The fallacy of the court's instruction is found by
referring to Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland,
P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989):
Nothing that one ordinarily does in the
course of a normal life span is comparable to
the decision to deprive another of either his
or her life or liberty by voting to convict
for a crime. Profound differences exist
between decisions to convict another person
and decisions to enter into marriage, buy a
home, invest money, have a child, or have a
medical operation - or whatever else might be
deemed a weighty affair of life.
The mental process employed in deciding
that someone has committed a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt is different from the mental
process employed in making decisions in the
"more weighty affairs of life." In making
the latter type decision, a person looks
forward and makes a decision about future
conduct. A degree of risk is always inherent
in such a decision, and usually the degree of
risk based on doubt about future events is
significant. The process employed in making
such decisions is only partly a matter of
assessment of past facts; instead, the
decision often rests on a degree of hope,
determination, and frequently, personal
resolve. In most cases, the decision is
revocable, but whether or not revocable, it
is at least salvageable.
A decision to convict always looks
backward; it is concerned only about
resolving conflicting versions of factual
propositions about a past event. It is
always irrevocable as to the jurors. The
process does not involve the decision maker's
hope, determination, or willingness to
undertake a personal risk. Rather, such a
decision demands reason, impartiality, and
common sense. A jury must have a greater
assurance of the correctness of its decision,
if it is to comply with the constitutional
mandate, than the individual jurors are
likely to have in making the "weighty"
decisions they confront in their own lives.
Id. at 1381 (citations omitted).
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justice Stewart's dissent

in Ireland:•
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AppelJ ant ' s instruct JO:
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follows:
A l l j . -->uu;t"i.
f law, independ ent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
a defendant's guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he or she is entitled to an acquittal,
I have heretofore told you that the
burden is upon the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that
is based on reason and one which is
recisonable in view of all the evidence. A
recisonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable
men and women would entertain, and it must
arise from the evidence or the 1 ack of
evidence in this case.
If, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence in the case,
you can candidly say that you have the kind

?

, n^cn

of doubt which would cause a person to
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt.
Deciding that someone has committed a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different
from making decisions concerning the more
weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of
life, a person looks forward and, based on a
degree of hope, determination and personal
resolve, makes a decision that involves a
degree of risk.
A decision to convict or not looks
backward. It is always irrevocable as to
your decision. It demands reason,
impartiality and common sense. You must have
a greater assurance of correctness of this
decision than you normally have in making the
weighty decisions in your life.
(R. 596).
The court wrote the basis for its rejection of the
instruction on the instruction:
Requested by Defendant, but not given
by the Court (instruction #9 given). The
reference to "more weighty affairs", is in
any way, has the same potential for
misleading the jury as to what "reasonable
doubt" is. The "irrevocable" reference might
mislead the jury to the conclusion that the
Defendant is without any remedies, such as
new trial, appeal, parole, etc., and make
suggest without any remedies, such as new
trial, appeal, parole, etc., and make
suggest something about the severity of the
penalty, without regard to the options
available to the sentencing Judge.
(R. 596).
While the court's ruling is somewhat obtuse, the
language of the requested instruction is a clear definition of
reasonable doubt which comports with the Utah Supreme Court's
understanding of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt".
The jurors were first instructed about the meaning of
reasonable doubt during the voir dire, in a manner conflicting
66

directly with the Supreme Court's opinions in Johnson, 774 P.2d
1141, 1148-1149; and Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1381.

See language

emphasized in court's instruction, supra, page 62-63.

They were

also encouraged by the prosecutor to accept the inadmissible
professional conclusions of the expert witnesses that Susan Quas
was a homicide victim as having met the standard of proof applied
by those professionals, which standard supposedly met or exceeded
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof (T. 893-894,
946).

Rather than correcting these errors, the court gave an

instruction that defines reasonable doubt in a manner that is
even more circular and abstract than the definition condemned in
Johnson and Ireland.

Instruction 7 read as follows:

All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence. A
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
The burden is on the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require proof to an absolute certainty. A
reasonable doubt is based on reason and
common sense and not on speculation or
imagination. It is a doubt that is
reasonable in view of all of the evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy
the mind and convince those who are bound to
act conscientiously upon such proof. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable
men and women would hold after consideration
of the evidence or lack of evidence in the
case.
In this case, as in Ireland and Johnson, the jurors
were left without a concrete understanding of the incomparable
significance of their decision to take another's freedom because
67

the court's instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable
doubt were inadequate.
As is demonstrated by reference to the statement of
facts, supra, it cannot be said that beyond a reasonable doubt
the jurors would have convicted Appellant, had they been
instructed correctly.

Appellant is therefore entitled to

reversal of his conviction .
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction, and
order the case dismissed.

w

Respectfully submitted this Y \

day of April, 1990.
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APPENDIX 1
Excerpts from hearing on October 18, 1988
before Magistrate Eleanor Van Sciver

if you wish to follow through on prosecuting.
As I said in the absence of the court reporter,
but I'll repeat for your record on the transcript for the
court reporter; last year, when I heard this case,
Mr. McConkie was representing the State.

A great deal of

evidence, both Ms. Remal and I will recall this, and you
probably will, Mr. Matheson, because you've reviewed the
transcript.

A great deal of evidence came before this Court

with respect to gunshot residue tests and the effect and
impact of shooting a firearm, and whether or not the
individual shooting the firearm would have certain markings
on his or her body, if in fact that individual had shot that
firearm.

And at the outset, I assumed that Mr. KcConkie was

going to put a great deal of weight into the effect of the
gunshot residue tests.
And we had a discussion at the bar, and I'm not
certain this is contained in the transcript, because to be
perfectly honest, I remember the case, and I have not reread the transcript since you gave me the transcript.
He approached the bench, I believe Ms. Remal was
there also—and you can correct me if I'm wrong—and said
that gunshot residue tests were not to be considered by the
Court because they were scientifically so nebulous that one
ought not to rely on it at all; but we got more and more
evidence about gunshot residue tests.

Now, is that a fair

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC.

statement?
MS, REMAL:

There was something to that effect.

I don f t remember the exact-THE COURT:

Well, I think it may have been a side

bar conference.
MS. REMAL:

It was.

THE COURT:

With Mr. McConkie and the Court.

MS. REMAL:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

And itfs not that I would have excluded)

It was.

you, but I was wondering, you know, what—why are we—you
know, are you going to rely upon these gunshot residue tests
and we got into a discussion.

No.

Then the evidence went forward, we had a great deal
of evidence about gunshot residue tests.

The State ?ledical

Examiner, Dr. Gray, took the stand, and testified that his
opinion was based on this and this and this and gunshot
residue tests.
Now, there were some mental gymnastics that were
attempted to be displayed before the Court; that is, that I
can make my opinion absent the gunshot residue test.

It was

the conclusion of the Court that he could not; therefore,
his opinion was not admissible.

And that was really one of

the important things for the Court, the fact that I would
not consider the State Medical Examiner's opinion because he
relied upon gunshot residue tests.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SFRVTrF
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Now, if the State can present to me scientifically
based evidence that gunshot residue tests can provide the
basis for the opinion, then I think this Court is in a
different posture.

But it doesnft surround whether or not

neighbors were—saw things or didn't see things, although
that may be relevant, but I think that the most critical
issue to me was whether or not I should consider gunshot
residue tests as the basis for the opinion of the State
Medical Examiner, as well as the other physical evidence thatj
was presented about the scene of the crime.
Now, does anybody want to talk about that?
MR. MATHESON:
THE COURT:

Yes?

Your Honor, first of all, I —

For the record, Mr. Quas is not here.

MR. MATHESON:

That's right.

The State ic not

taking the position that a GSR test is scientifically
nebulous; in fact, it's our intention to present GSR
residue tests both with respect to the victim and with
respect to a number of individuals who were involved with the|
test-firing of the gun.

And if that's what the Court is

interested in hearing, that's certainly something that we
want to present.
Your statements, though, I think, do require a
response and really a question, I think, and I'd like to
hear from the defense on this, because since this case has
been refiled, we run into some legal authority that raises
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1

some questions in my mind about what exactly the State

2

needs to d o , not only to establish probable cause, which in

3
4

m

Y judgment, in reviewing the evidence, and what I expect to

be presented here, should not be a problem for the State.
I also don f t think it would be a problem for the

5
6

| State to meet the second issue, which I think you have to
, decide now, which you didn't have to decide before, and that

8
9

is whether we have met the due process requirements of
State vs. Brickey, to refile this case.
Now, if I just put on the GSR evidence, that may

10
11

be enough for this Court in terms of probable cause.
THE COURT:

12

MR. MATHESON:

13
14
15
16

put enough on to meet the State vs. Brickey refiling
standard.

And for that r e a s o n —
THE COURT:

And you may have to have some new

evidence, Mr. Matheson.
MR. MATHESON:

19

THE COURT:

20
21

But I don f t want to put us in the

position of being vulnerable to the argument that we didn't

17
18

Well—

That's —

My question is, is because you changed

prosecutors, can you change your mind?
MR. MATHESON:

22

Well, I don't think we're changing

23

anything; what we're doing is presenting you additional

24

evidence.

25

additional evidence we need, both to meet probable cause and

And the question, I think, is how much new and

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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to meet the refiling standards.

That's the reason we think

. w e ' r e — w e really have no choice, but to error on the side
I of caution to the extent this becomes a review issue later
4

5
6
7
8
9

I on.

And for that reason, we do have the next-door neighbor,

and we do have some additional—
THE COURT:
put that on.

Oh, and I'm not saying that you can't

What I'm saying is that the issue that

really troubled the Court from the get-go is the issue of
gunshot residue and how that became so involved in the
evidence that was presented, and then the Court was advised

10
by the prosecutor at that time that the Court was to ignore
11
that because it was scientifically invalid.
12
MR. MATHESON:

Well, my review of the transcript,

13
14

at least, that may have been an off-the-record statement,
but the prosecutor at that time, on the transcript,, did make

15
an argument, and I think it was the correct argument under
16
7 03 of the Rules of Evidence, but Dr. Gray should have been
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

able to give his opinion based on the GSR test in any event.
So, in terms of what's on the record, I

don't see anything

about scientific nebulousness, or anything else of that
kind; and I would like to disabuse the Court that that's
going to be the State's position, and I don't see that as
being the State's position last time, but perhaps Mr. Stott
can--(inaudible) m e , 'cause I wasn't there.
MR. STOTT:

For the benefit of the record, your
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Honor, as you know, I was here.

I was not the lead counsel,

but I was backing-up, so to speak, Mr. McConkie,

And I

don't know what he said at side bar, frankly, obviously, I
wasn't there; but I do know our position was not that the
GSR was not something that Mr. Gray could consider and could
base his opinion on, and if Mr. McConkie gave you that type
of indication, that's inconsistent with what we had olanned
for, and I think was inconsistent with what he argued later \
on to the Court.

j
i

THE COURT:

Well, no, he didn't—I don't think he «

argued, but he thought that the opinion could come in and he
could play—and I think there was some discussion about

j

mental gymnastics on the record.

[

And I questioned whether

he could engage in that kind of intellectual—well, that he
could intellectually remove himself.

He said he could.

But

there was so much evidence of that gunshot residue and it

.

was so intertwined in his opinion, and it may have been the !
State's theory, I'm just telling you what Mr. McConkie told
me.
And Mr. McConkie may have presented a case that
was not what everybody agreed was to be the theory of the
case.
MR. MATHESON:

Well, are you saying then that if

our theory now is that the GSR is something that is
reliable, is acceptable in scientific opinion and something

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

that a medical examiner normally relies upon, we can
establish that and the Court will now hear that evidence and
maybe look upon it in a different light.
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).

MR. MATHESON:

If that is so, I think we can

proceed to go forward.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, perhaps I could respond to

that.
I think that the first thing that the Court is
required to do in this situation, since this is a refiling
of the same charge is, under State vs. Brickey, decide
whether or not there's new evidence.

And we have given you

a couple of cases, Mr. Matheson gave you some cases attached,
using the Miranda, which I think speak exactly to that
issue.
It seems quite clear to me from the case law that
new or previously unavailable evidence means—and this is
from the Jones vs. State case, which was cited specifically
and followed by our Court in State vs. Brickey; additional
or new evidence does not mean that which was known to the
State at the time of the first preliminary hearing or which
could have been easily acquired.
Based on the memorandum which Mr. Matheson provided!
to us and to the Court and reviewing the summaries of what
he intends to offer at the second preliminary hearing, it

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

APPENDIX 2
Summary of preliminary hearings submitted
by the State in an effort to justify refiling the information
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"The prosecution is not required to introduce its entire
case

at

the hearing. ...!f Anderson,

612 P. 2d at

786.

"There is

always a presumption that the State will strengthen its evidence
at

trial

by

charge."
1986).

production

everything

Matricia v. State, 726 P.2d
Indeed,

preliminary
evidence."
1979)

of

"the

hearing

burden

may

be

of

met

favorable

to

support

the

900, 903 (Okla. Crim. App.

putting

entirely

on

evidence

through

at

a

circumstantial

State v. Maynard, 596 P.2d 893, 895 (Okla. Crim. App.

(quoting

Berryhill

v.

State,

568

P.2d

1306, 1310

(Okla.

Crim. App. 1977)).
Occasionally

the

State

may

in good

faith miscalculate

and present not only less than all the evidence it has but also
less evidence than is sufficient to establish probable cause.

In

this regard, it is instructive that in State v. Brickey, the Utah
Supreme
cited

Court,

Harper

in

adopting

v. District

the

Oklahoma

Court, 484 P.2d

approach
891

to

refiling,

(Okla. 1971), and

described it as "holding that good cause to continue a preliminary
hearing

for further

innocently

investigation might

miscalculates

the

quantum

exist when a prosecutor
of

evidence

required

to

obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly would not be
dilatory."

714 P.2d at 647 n.S.
III.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING IN STATE V. QUAS
CRIMINAL NO. 871005536

At the preliminary hearing

in State v. Quas held on July
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witnesses and five exhibits.

The State contended then, as it does
M

now, that the evidence established
defendant

from

defendant

which

was guilty

P.2d at 783.

the

a prima facie case against the

trier

of

fact

could

of the offense as charged.,f

conclude

the

Anderson, 612

Of particular importance was the expert testimony of

Dr. Todd Cameron Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner for the State of
Utah, who testified, based on his examination of Susan Quas, that
4
the manner of her death was homicide.
The Court was not satisfied

that

the State had met its

burden of showing probable cause and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss.

Accordingly,

adduced,

the State

in

will

establish probable cause.
square
cause

one
was

evidence
toward

because
presented

did

not

doing

so.

addition

present

new

the

and

evidence

additional

previously
evidence

to

The State, of course, does not start at

substantial
on

to

July

establish

evidence

23 and
probable

Therefore,

for

31,

probative
L987.

cause,

the

probable

Indeed, if that

it went

Court's

of

and

a long

way

the parties1

benefit, that evidence is summarized briefly below.

4

"The pathologist is one of the best qualified experts on the
subject of cause of death, and is the best qualified expert on the
manner or mode of death. The pathologist's opinions are vital not
only because of his expertise but also because other experts'
opinions on these subjects are so often wrong." P. Gianelli § E.
Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 680 (1986),
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A.

Brooke Plotnick

Officer
Department

Brooke

testified

Plotnick

of

that he received

the

West

Valley

Police

the dispatch call for this

incident at 9:41 p.m. on June IS, 1987, and arrived at the Quas
residence at 9:45.
sheet

with

He observed the deceased Susan Quas lying on a

a gunshot

wound

in her

eye.

Officer

spoke with and observed defendant John Quas.
Officer

Plotnick

noise, exited
floor.

that he—Quas--was

Plotnick

also

Defendant Quas told

in the shower, heard a bang

the shower, and found his wife on the living room

However, Officer Plotnick, who was within two feet

of Mr.

Quas when defendant made these statements, testified that Mr. Quas
did not appear to have showered because the defendant's hands and
face were dirty and because his hair was dirty and dry in parts
and not soaked as if it had been washed.
Officer
the

Quas

Plotnick

residence

fight[s].f!

On

incident

June

of

spouse abuse.

one

further

three
of

testified

times

these

15, Officer

Tr. at 5-11, 17-21.
that

before

occasions,
Plotnick

he had been to

concerning

six

weeks

arrested

"family

before

Susan

Quas

the
for

Tr. at 12-13.

Finally, based upon his experience in responding to
suicide-by-gunshot

cases, Officer

Plotnick

testified

that

Susan

Quasfs death did not appear to be a suicide because there was an
absence

of

blood

spattering

around

the

body

and

an absence of
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gunpowder

on her face, and because

inconsistent with suicide.
B.

the position of the body was

Tr. at 15.

Ronald T. Edwards

Detective

Ronald

T.

Edwards

of

the West

Valley

Police

Department testified that he was called to investigate this matter
and

arrived

residence.

at about

10:15 p.m.

Tr. at 25.

on June

15, 1987, at

the Quas

He observed and talked with defendant Quas

within twenty-five minutes of arriving.

Tr. at 28, 51.

Among other things, defendant Quas told Detective Edwards
that

he--Quas--had

evening

and

that

been

the

arguing

fighting

with

had

his

wife

escalated.

throughout

Mr. Quas

the

said

he

told Susan that he was leaving for Tonopah, Nevada, that he went
into the bedroom, took off his clothes, put on his bathrobe, and
went

downstairs

to

put

his

clothes

in

the

washer.

Edwards that he came back upstairs and observed Susan
the weapon.

an

told

!t

dry-f i ring"

Susan told her husband she would kill herself if he

left for Nevada.
shower.

Quas

Quas said he then went to the bathroom to take a

He was in the shower for four to five minutes and heard

explosion.

Mr.

Quas

then

said

he

ran

out

of

the

shower,

observed his wife, picked up the gun, put it back down, and then
made a telephone call to #911.

Tr. at 34-35.

In spite of Mr. Quas!s

representations

about

showering,

Detective Edwards observed that Mr. Quas!s hands and fingernails
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were

dirty

(Detective

Edwards

noted

a grease mark on the right

hand) and that his hair was dirty and sticking out on the side.
Tr. at 32, 49-51.

Detective Edwards testified that Mr. Quas did

not appear to have showered.

Tr. at 36.

Detective Edwards also inspected the bathroom and shower
at

issue

at

about

11:00 p.m.

and

found

that

the towels, sink,

shower door, shower soap dish tray, and the shower itself were all
dry.

Tr. at 37, 52.
A primary factor in Detective Edwards' decision to arrest

John Quas was the pattern of hot lead residue left on the face of
Susan Quas--the "tattooing.fl

Based on his experience in reviewing

such patterns, Detective Edwards concluded that the gun was shot
eighteen to twenty-four

inches away from Susan QuasTs face.

Tr.

at 41-42.
On June 26, 1987, Detective Edwards performed a test on
the shower at the Quas residence.

He turned

it on for three to

four

inspected

it

minutes,

turned

if

off, and

increments up to thirty minutes.
was

still

soap cup.

wet, including
Tr. at 40-41.

the

at

five

minute

After thirty minutes the shower

shower

nozzle, handles, wall, and

This testimony should be reconsidered in

light of the anticipated testimony of Sergeant Spann.

(See below.)
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C,

Robert W. Brinkman

Robert W. Brinkman, a criminalist
Crime

Laboratory,

this

case.

conducted

These

tests

test

firings

served

for the State of Utah
of the gun involved

as

one

basis

testified

for

the

for

the

in

expert

testimony of Dr. Todd Cameron Grey.
Mr.

Brinkman

also

defense

concerning

the stippling or so-called "tattooing" phenomenon, which describes
the penetration of the flesh with powder particles from the muzzle
of the weapon.

Tr. at 173.

He said that he would be surprised to

find stippling unless the muzzle of the gun is within six to nine
inches

of

the

flesh.

Tr.

at

175.

However,

in

giving

this

opinion, Mr. Brinkman never made specific reference to the gun in
this

case.

Moreover, he said generally

that penetration of the

skin would depend on several factors--type of ammunition, caliber
of weapon, configuration of powder in the cartridge, and length of
barrel.

Tr. at 173-74.

Finally and most important, Mr. Brinkman

has never performed an autopsy and has not examined Susan Quas and
observed
testified

the

stippling

that

a

on

her

determination

face.
of

Dr.
exact

Todd
range

Cameron

Grey

requires

a

comparison between the stippling on Susan Quas's body and the

5
According
to P. Gianelli
§ E. Imwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence 721 (1986): "Most handguns using flake powdTr rarely
cause stippling beyond 18 inches.
Ball powder can stipple the
body up to approximately 3 1/2 - 4 feet."

MEMORANDUM ON PROBABLE CAUSE,
REFILING CHARGES, AND REVIEW OF
EVIDENCE FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
State v. John Quas
Page thirteen

results of test firing
Tr. at 97.

the same weapon with the same ammunition.

Mr. Brinkman did not do that, and he is not qualified

to do that.
D.

Dr. Todd Cameron Grey

Dr. Todd Cameron Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner, State
of Utah, examined
report.

the body of Susan Quas and prepared an autopsy

Tr. at 109.

In his training and experience as of July

1987, Dr. Grey had viewed approximately 400 homicide cases and 200
to

300

gunshot

wound

suicide

cases,

and

he

personally

had

performed examinations of 100 to 200 gunshot wound suicide victims
and of 100 gunshot wound homicide victims.
manner

of

death

in

this

case

was

He concluded that the

homicide.

Tr. at

148.

His

conclusion was based on several factors.
First, the

angle

accidental shooting.
Second, the
the

left

of the wound was inconsistent with an

Tr. at 110, 143-44, 151-52.
location of the wound — the inside corner of

eye--was, in Dr. Grey!s experience, fairly uncommon in

suicide.

Tr. at 143-44, 153.
Third, there was a wide pattern of stippling

the wound.

surrounding

Dr. Grey testified that he had "never seen a suicidal

gunshot wound with the wide pattern of stippling that is seen in
this

case."

He

had

seen

a

large

number

of

cases

in

which

stippling was on the body, and this case was similar to others in
which he had participated.

Tr. at 95-96.
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Fourth,

which

is

related

to

the

stippling,

Dr. Grey-

testified that in his experience suicide gunshot wounds are almost
always contact wounds or inflicted within one or two inches of the
body, whereas in this case there was an intermediate range wound,
Tr. 93, 157-58.
Fifth, Dr. Grey

compared

the

stippling

on Susan Quas's

face with stippling patterns produced through test firings of the
gun.

See

Exhibits

concluded

5

and

that the distance

6.

Based

on

this

comparison,

of the muzzle of the gun from Susan

Quas's face was sixteen to eighteen inches when it was fired.
at

141-42.

Having

testified:

he

measured

Susan

Quas!s

arm, Dr. Grey

Tr.

further

"You can't get eighteen inches away and have the wound

path as described holding the weapon in this manner."

Tr. at 99,

110-11.
Sixth, although the foregoing was sufficient for Dr. Grey
to

reach

support
Lab.

his

gunshot
This

performed
Court

opinion,
residue

on Susan

sustained

a type

field

Quas

concerned
and

defendant's

144, he mentioned
results from
a

GSR

the State
objection

Tr. at 101-04.

reasonably

in forming

Tr. at

(GSR) test

information

these test results.
"of

see

relied

upon

test

Crime

as further

the State Crime
that

Dr.

Grey

Lab analyzed.

The

to Dr. Greyfs referring to
Because

by experts

opinions or inferences upon

this information is
in the particular
the subject," Rule
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703, Utah R. Evid., see Tr. at 102-03, the State contends that Dr.
Grey

should

results

have

because

been

allowed

n

or

such

facts

to

testify

data

need

concerning

not

be

the

admissible

GSR
in

evidence.'1

Rule 703, Utah R. Evid.; see State v. Schreuder, 726

P.2d

1223-24

1215,

(Utah

1986);

Barson

v.

E.R.

Squibb

§ Sons,

Inc., 682 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1984).
IV.

New
preliminary

and

additional

hearing

set forth here.
witnesses

SUMMARY PROFFER OF NEW OR PREVIOUSLY
UNAVAILABLE EVIDENCE THAT JUSTIFIES
REFILING OF THE CHARGE
evidence

is summarized

to

be

presented

at

the

in the Information and briefly

The State reserves the right to call additional

who have

spoken with Mr. Quas since the death of his

wife or who have observed Mr. or Mrs. Quas at any relevant time.
The State further reserves the right to present any further facts
or demonstrations that may be developed.
A.

James Gaskill and Dr. Grey

The

State

Criminalistics

intends

Laboratory,

to

call

Weber

James

State

Gaskill,

College.

Director,

Mr.

Gaskill

supervised numerous test firings of the gun at issue in this case
at

the

Weber

gunshot
shooters.
residue.

State

residue
The

College

samples
GSR

Moreover,

test

Crime

were
in all

gunshot

Lab.

taken

After

from

cases was

residue

was

the

the

hands

positive
not

test

fires,
of

the

for gunshot

detected

on

the
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persons

present

during

the

tests

or

on

those

who

handled

the

weapon after testing.

Mr. Gaskill also will testify that the GSR

samples

Grey

taken

gunshot

Dr.

residue

demonstrates
commit

by

was

that

suicide.

corroborate

and

from

found.

Susan

Quas

The

Weber

bolster

Susan

To
did

Mr.
not

State
Grey!s

Dr.

Quas

were

tested

Gaskill,
fire

this

and

no

evidence

the gun and did not

Crime
opinion

Lab

tests

that

the

further

manner

of

death was homicide.
B.

David Farr

David Farr of the State Crime Lab will testify concerning
a

photograph

that

he

took

of

the

Quas

gun

being

fired.

This

photograph complements and reinforces the opinions of Dr. Grey and
Mr. Gaskill.
C.

Ronald T. Edwards

The

State

also

will

present

evidence

that

Detective

Edwards, in the course of his investigation, observed fresh blood
on

the

plastic

residence.
showing

carpet

protector

on

the

stairs

of

Samples were taken and tests arranged

the

blood

to

be

the

same

type

as

that

the

Quas

by Mr. Gaskill
of Susan

Quas.

Detective Edwards will testify that there was no blood splattering
around the victim, which is uncommon in suicide cases.
Edwards
recovered

also
from

will
the

testify

concerning

washing

machine

on

the
June

freshly

Detective

washed

15, which

items

consisted
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mostly 'of towels, in contrast to defendant Quas's statement that
clothes

were

being

washed

to

prepare

for

a

trip

to

Nevada.

Through Detective Edwards, evidence will be presented that the hot
water

heater

function.
in

the

in

again.

Quas

residence

was

broken

and

did

not

There was no other source of hot water for the shower

house.

returned

the

Finally,

on

August

20, 1988, Detective

Edwards

to the Quas residence and performed a test on the shower
This time he checked

running the water.
D.

the shower for ninety minutes after

Again, the shower was still wet.

Edward Spann

Sergeant

Edward

Spann

of

the

West

Valley

Police

Department will testify that he arrived at the Quas residence on
June

IS,

arrived.

1987,
He

a

had

few
been

minutes

after

advised

of

Officers
John

Cox

Quas's

and

report

he--Quas--had been showering when the shooting occurred.
Spann spoke with Quas as the latter was standing
between the bathroom and the living room.

Plotnick
that

Sergeant

in the hallway

Sergeant Spann observed

that the robe John Quas was wearing was not clinging to him, that
Quas f s hair was damp on top but dry below the surface, and that
Quasfs
noticed
living

hands and fingernails

were dirty.

Sergeant Spann further

that the plastic carpet runner between
room

was

dry.

These

observations

led

the

bathroom and

Sergent

Spann

to
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inspect

the bathroom, where he found

the bathroom floor dry, the

shower/bathtub dry, the shower head not dripping and dry, and the
two

towels

on a rack dry.

Sergeant

Spann will

testify

that he

inspected the shower within ten minutes of his arrival at the Quas
residence, which was within twenty minutes of Quas's initial call
for

police

Spann heard

assistance.

After

the washer running.

checking

the

bathroom,

Quas explained

Sergeant

to Spann that he

was washing his clothes to prepare for a trip to Tonopah, Nevada.
E.

Pam Young

Pam Young, who lives next door to the home where Susan
Quas was shot, will testify that on June 15, 1987, at about

9:15

p.m. , she was walking past the Quas residence and could see John
Quas through the living room window.
front

porch

of

her

own

home

and

Ms. Young proceeded to the

sat

there

for

about

fifteen

minutes, at which point paramedics and police arrived at the Quas
residence.

Between

the

time

Ms.

Young

walked

past

the

Quas

residence to the time that the police and paramedics arrived, Ms.
Young did not hear a gunshot or any other sound coming from the
Quas

home.

On August

20, 1988, Detective

Edwards

arranged

and

supervised a test firing of the gun inside the Quas residence when
Pam Young was located on her front porch.

Ms. Young will testify

that she heard the firing of the gun very distinctly on August 20,
1988, and that she heard no similar sound on June 15, 1987.
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F.

Kris Knudson

Kris Knudson will testify that in September 1987, shortly
after the original preliminary hearing, John Quas made statements
to her about

the death of Susan Quas that are inconsistent with

statements he made on the evening of June 15, 1987.
the

evidence

shows

that

defendant

Quas

told

For example,

police

officers on

June 15 that he called the police immediately upon discovery that
his wife had been shot.

However, he told Ms. Knudson that after

he found his wife shot in the living room, he went downstairs for
a few minutes to check his wash before calling the police because
Susan already was dead.
primarily

towels

on

The wash in question was found to contain

June

15.

However, defendant

Quas told Ms.

Knudson that he had been washing clothes*
* * * * *

The foregoing satisfies the standard of State v. Brickey,
714

P.2d

644,

unavailable
evidence

647

(Utah

1986),

because

evidence has surfaced.n

for the Court

to conclude

"new

or

previously

Indeed, there is now ample
that the charged offense has

been committed and that defendant Quas committed it.
CONCLUSION
The

State

adheres

to

its

position

at

the

first

preliminary hearing that sufficient evidence was presented at that
time

to establish

probable

cause.

The Court reached

a contrary

APPENDIX 3
Excerpts from transcript of interrogation of Appellant
conducted at 1:10 a.m. at the police station by Officer Edwards

This interview is with John Quasf the NCIC code is 0901, criminal
homicide. Case number 87-15436.
Edwards:

John what is your full and correct name?

Quas:

Quas,

Edwards:

First name John.

Quas:

yes,

Edwards:

Middle name James?

Quas:

Yes.

Edwards:

Okay, what is your date of birth John?

Quas:

11-16-50.

Edwards:

Okay, what is your address?

Quas:

4165 S. 3376 W. Sunnybrook.

Edwards: The reason we are here at the West Valley Police
Department, John and myself Detective Ron Edwards is the death of
John's wife Susan M. Quas.
Cause of death is gunshot wound to
the head.
John for your safety as well as for my safety I am
going to read you your rights per miranda. You have the right to
have an attorney, John you have the right to remain silent,
anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of
law.
You have the right to have an attorney present before-during or after any questioning.
You have the right to stop
questions anytime if you wish. If you cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed to you by the courts. Do you understand
these rights?
Quas:

Yes.

Edwards:

Do you still wish to speak to me at this time.

Quas:

I would rather have an attorney.

Edwards:

You would rather have an attorney.

Quas:

Yes because I don't know what is going on here.

Edwards: Okay, what's going on is that we are going to ask you
some questions about what happened tonight.
Quas:

I have no, I was in the shower.

Edwards: Well I just want to start from the beginning, lets say
about 5:00 o'clock this afternoon, what happened at 5:00, 5:30,
6:00, 6:30 what could have lead up to her shooting herself.

page Two
87-15436
Quas:
tape,

You wouldn't hold

that against me if I told you on

Edwards: This tape is for your protection, if it is on tape
there is no way I can lie, there is no way you can lie,
everything is right there. It is just part of the investigation.
Quas:

Okay what happened.

Edwards:

Do you wish to speak to me then.

Quas:
I don't
anything.

know

if

it

Edwards:
about.

If you did nothing

Quas:

I was in the shower.

is
then

safe
there

or

not,

I didn't do

is nothing

to worry

Edwards: We are not going to throw something at you that is not
fair, what we are doing is what we do on every death. Everytime
there is a death this is what we do. I mean we don't go around
looking for reason to hang anybody.
Quas:
There was no reason, there was no reason for her to do
that, there was no reason at all.
Edwards:

Why do you think she did it for.

Quas:
Because she drinks too damn much, that!s the reason,
she drinks too much, she won't listen to me, she won't listen to
anybody. I told her quit it, I said please stop, just stop once.
Edwards:

When did you tell her to stop drinking.

Quas:
This was been probably clear back when we lived in
Elko, Nevada, please will you stop drinking so much, you get so
nuts, you don't know what you are doing.
Edwards:

How long has she been drinking like this?

Quas:

I don't know, I've known her probably for 13 years,

Edwards:

And you have been married for 3 years,

Quas:
Yea, our anniversary was coming up, and I said don't
you think with all the trouble that we are having, don't you
think that maybe I should leave for a couple of weeks, I said
maybe for a couple of weeks, and she said if you leave I will
shoot myself, and I was washing my clothes. Well she has taken
that gun out before and played with it, she has pointed it at me,

Page Nine
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Quas:
5'9", I quess, I don't know I never looked.
I just
couldn't believe it. All I could do I mean I was in the service
and I've seen alot of really strange stuff, okay, I mean alot of
really strange things, but I don't think I am going to get ovei
this,
Edwards:

This is going to be really hard.

Quas:
This is something that I am going to have to live witl
because there are not, anybody better not say anything because
loved that girl with everything in my heart, I loved her so much
but she could not stay away from the booze and the drugs. Sh<
would not listen to a damn (inaudible) in fact if you guys eve
need a good detective I am qualified.
Edwards:

Where did you use to be a cop at?

Quas:
Well I was a Maryland State patrolman for about nin
months because I didn't like it. Then I was a military policema
with CID & PMI, and I can show you on DDT14, and if I could catc
every kid, I mean I am talking about alcohol, drugs, I don't car
what I would tell them you know what you are going to do to you
life. You are going to go through the same thing that I am goin
through right now, and I will never forget this.
I can't,
can't even live in that house anymore.
Edwards:

After you leave here who are you going to go stay with

Quas:
I think I will call Russ or something, I told that gu
put me in jail, I would be just as happy to be in jail, I reall
would.
Edwards:

Whose Russ?

Quas:
Oh this is a friend of mine he is really nice, Rus
Wagher, he is really straight. He's a really nice guy.
Edwards :

How do you spell his last name?

Quas :

W A G H E R ,

Edwards:

I'm sorry W A

Quas :

W A G H E R .

Edwards:

Where does he live at.

Quas :

I would have to call him on the phone.

Edwards:

What is his phone number.

he can tell you how drunk she gets.

Page Ten
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Quas:
Well see I have it written down in the little brown
book I have at home. I would let you guys know anything that you
want to know.
Edwards: Well, the thing it is you can call him from here and
have him come pick you up,
Quas:
It's just that I can f t believe that she would get so
smashed so would do something like this, I never thought. I
thought she would have more brains than that, she is a smart,
smart girl, but I didn't think she was dumb enough to do anything
like this.
Edwards: Some people
possible.

just get so wacked out that anything is

Quas:
I just didn't think she would, I had no idea. She was
talking really strange, she started talking to herself ont he
stairs, but I wasn't paying attention I was going out to the
garage. I was just going oh you know, that's the way it goes. I
said I think I should leave for a couple of weeks, and I started
washing my clothes, and I said I am going to take a shower, and
while I was in the shower I heard this bang, I mean it was like
this boom.
Edwards:

How long was you in the shower?

Quas:
I wasn't there more than probably 4 minutes, I think 4
or 5 minutes. Then I came out and I didn't know what to do, it's
killing me I am not going to know what to do with the rest of my
life.
Edwards:

Do you have any idea what time it happened?

Quas:
I didn't look honest to god, I mean if I could tell you
the truth I would tell you the truth, I didn't look at a clock.
Edwards:

Why don't you.

Quas:
This ring was given to me by a guy in the Navy because
I was in Vietnam, so he gave me a ring.
I don't know why, if I
could tell you as a detective I would tell you, shit you would be
a psychiatrist then I quess. I don't know why I have no idea. I
won't be able to live, I mean I have to go back to (inaudible) or
go to counseling. I mean I wish that I could hear her voice right
now, she could scream at me all she wants, she use to scream at
me all the time.
Edwards:

Why did she use to scream at you.

Quas:

I played guitar, and I was Wayne Newton's guitar player

page Thirteen
87-15436
trying to hustle me I don't know. And she
went across her arm and I went are you crazy
people don't do things like that Susan,
anyway.
I don't know what else to tell you
am, like I say,
Edwards: One thing you said
touched the gun,

just took it and she
or something, I said
and she just did it
I mean I am sick# I

that you picked

up the gun, you

Quas:
yea I reached over and grabbed it, yea cause I thought
she was faking me out or something.
Where was it at, it was
sitting, I think to her right by her stomach, and I looked and I
thought god she is not faking. So I just ran right over and
called 911.
Edwards:

So where did you grab it at, where did you touch it at?

Quas:

I wish I knew,

Edwards:

Okay, but you did touch it?

Quas:

Yea I did touch it.

Edwards: We will need to take your fingerprints tonight so that
we can match it up. You have no objections to that? You don't
have to do anything, you know,
Quas:

Should I get a lawyer?

Edwards: I don't see why you would need one right now? All we
are doing is investigating the death of your wife, you know its
awful hard I understand that, we try to be as compassionate and
caring as we can, but we still have to do our job.
Quas:

She didn't have to do this.

Edwards: No they don't. Why they do it, if we ever figured that
out I would be working at the male clinic.
Quas:

She didn't have to do it, not over booze.

Edwards: That's where they usually start drugs or booze. You
say that she was against religion, did she ever practice in the
occult or anything?
Quas:

She just didn't like Mormonism and I did.

Edwards:

Are you LDS?

Quas:

Not yet, I just have people who want me to be.
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the admission of Appellant's statements
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APPENDIX 5
Constitutional and statutory provisions not in text of brief

Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 [Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 [Trial by jury]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction,
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 [Rights of accused
persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.

